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I. INTRODUCTION
Starting from Directive 2015/2366 on Payment Services in the Internal
Market1 — known as PSD II in the European Union (EU) — countries across
the world have or are contemplating a new framework to govern data sharing
among different players in the financial market. “Open Banking,” as this
trend is called, requires or encourages — depending on the regulatory models
adopted in different jurisdictions — banks to share consumer-permissioned
banking data with third parties securely, in a form that facilitates its use.2
The Open Banking initiatives have diffused from the EU, and the UK, to
elsewhere. The current Open Banking trend raises analytical questions: is
data sharing novel in the banking sector? Before introducing Open Banking,
did banks share their data with third parties, and if so, how? On the other
hand, however, if data sharing did exist in the pre-Open Banking world, why
would governments ever bother to introduce the Open Banking initiatives at
all? What are the rationales or concerns justifying such regulatory
intervention? What do these regulatory responses look like, and how
effective are they in reacting to these concerns?
This Article seeks to contribute to the existing literature by addressing
these questions through a comparative lens. For our present purpose, we
focus on Open Banking initiatives in the UK and Australia. The former is
widely seen as a pioneer in Open Banking by rolling out its regime in 2018,3
while Australia is the first to launch a comprehensive data-sharing regime
across the whole economy.4 Both could serve as a template for other
jurisdictions to articulate their regimes. Analyzing key aspects of the
regulatory designs of these two models not only underscores the major
differences and the rationales underpinning them but also helps inform other
countries to configure or reflect upon their regulatory schemes when
1. Directive (EU) 2015/2366, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25
November 2015 on Payment Services in the Internal Market, 2015 O.J. (L 337) 35
[hereinafter PSD II].
2. See UK’s Open Banking to Launch on 13 January 2018, OPEN BANKING
IMPLEMENTATION ENTITY (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.openbanking.org.uk/aboutus/latest-news/uks-open-banking-launch-13-january-2018/ (“Open Banking is a term
that describes a secure set of technologies and standards that allow customers to give
companies other than their bank or building society permission to securely access their
accounts.”).
3. See id. (“[T]he UK will be the first nation to launch Open Banking when its
service goes live in early 2018.”).
4. See Victor Chatenay, Australia Has Rolled Out an Open Banking Regime, BUS.
INSIDER (July 6, 2020, 9:36 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/australia-openbanking-regime-goes-live-2020-7 (noting that on July 1, 2020, Australia’s Consumer
Data Right Act became law and will continue to be implemented across different sectors
of the economy in stages).
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introducing similar data-sharing initiatives.
Against this background, this Article proceeds as follows. Part II sets the
stage by unpacking the trajectory of data-sharing in the banking sector and
the underlying concerns that lead to regulatory responses via Open Banking
initiatives. Part III then examines in-depth the selected issues around Open
Banking, including the participants, the scope of data to be shared, liabilities
arising from authorized transactions, measures dealing with security and data
protection concerns, and the legality of screen scraping after Open Banking.
Part IV concludes.
II. OPEN BANKING: ORIGIN, RATIONALES, AND NORM DIFFUSION
A. Data Sharing in Banking Sector: A Shifting Landscape
Banks in most jurisdictions are subject to a legal obligation — by way of
contracts, statutes, or case law — to maintain “bank secrecy” or “bank
confidentiality” and conceal clients’ information.5 By virtue of clients’
consent or otherwise, banks could share consumers’ information with third
parties. Data sharing between banks and third parties might proceed through
either contractual arrangements or technologies. On the former, one oft-seen
arrangement is between a bank and a credit bureau to evaluate the
creditworthiness of prospective or existing customers.6 Of particular note is
the latter — data sharing through so-called “screen scraping,” a process by
which automated scripts extract portions of data from one application for
another to use.7 When screen scraping, a third party has access to a clients’
account credentials. By virtue of this insight, said third party can unearth
additional data without involving or alerting the bank where the account is
5. Traditionally, contract law is the most important source governing bankers’ duty
of secrecy. Where the contract is silent, this duty is interpreted by the courts to be an
implied term between a bank and its customer. Tournier v. Nat’l Provincial & Union
Bank of England, [1924] 1 KB 461 (Bankes LJ). See generally Dora Neo, A Conceptual
Overview of Bank Secrecy, in CAN BANKS STILL KEEP A SECRET? 3–30 (Sandra Booysen
& Dora Neo eds., 2017) (noting how banks are prohibited from disclosing their clients’
information in different countries).
6. See, e.g., HSBC, CREDIT INFORMATION MANAGEMENT POLICY (2020),
https://www.hsbc.com.au/content/dam/hsbc/au/docs/pdf/hsbc-credit-policy.pdf
(explaining that credit information is important to determining credit worthiness and how
credit information may be used in the process).
7. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, REPORT ON OPEN BANKING AND
APPLICATION PROGRAMMING INTERFACES 19 (2019) [hereinafter BASEL COMM., REPORT
ON OPEN BANKING]; see GoCardless, Screen Scraping 101: Who, What, Where, When?,
THE OPEN BANKING HUB (July 19, 2017), https://openbankinghub.com/screen-scraping101-who-what-where-when-f83c7bd96712 (describing how services use screenscrapping to access a user’s banking information, such as their last transaction, and the
potential associated risks).
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located.8
Screen scraping is nothing new. It closely relates to the emergence of
“data aggregation” (also known as “account aggregation,” or “financial
aggregation” as applied in the financial sector) some two decades ago. Data
aggregation services were first offered in the United States in the late 1990s.9
Such services catalogue clients’ account information from various
institutions in a central location; these service providers collate consumers’
financial data relating to, among other things, their “deposit accounts, credit
accounts, managed funds accounts, and[] brokerage accounts.”10 They also
collate non-financial data (e.g., those from email accounts).11 This business
model has since diffused throughout Europe and the Asia Pacific.12 As early
as 2000, for instance, Australia had seven firms providing data aggregation
services: two associated with financial institutions, and one provided by a
stockbroker.13 More recently, Fintech firms have been tapping into the
potential of data by purchasing data made available by data aggregators and
then using it to offer new products and services.14 Another technique
employed by third parties in recent years is reverse engineering, which
extracts information about the source code of mobile banking applications to
determine which information is exchanged between the bank’s server and
the applications.15 As it is more robust and generally unaffected by changes
to the bank’s interface, data aggregators typically prefer reverse engineering
to screen scraping.16
8. AUSTL. SEC. & INV. COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER 20: ACCOUNT
AGGREGATION IN THE FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTOR 15 (2001) [hereinafter ASIC
CONSULTATION PAPER 20].
9. See id. at 1.
10. Id. at 7.
11. Id.
12. See, e.g., Hiroshi Fujii et al., E-Aggregation: The Present and Future of Online
Financial Services in Asia-Pacific (Composite Info. Sys. Lab’y, Mass. Inst. of Tech.
Sloan Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper No. 2002-06, 2002), http://web.mit.edu/
smadnick/www/wp/2002-06.pdf.
13. See ASIC CONSULTATION PAPER 20, supra note 8, at 17–18 (illustrating the
results of the aggregation services provider study).
14. See Brian J. Hurh et al., Consumer Financial Data Aggregation and the Potential
for Regulatory Intervention, 71 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 20, 21 (2017) (noting that
with the acquired data, the offered products and services can be “more targeted and
tailored” to the consumer).
15. See THE AUSTL. GOV’T THE TREASURY, REVIEW INTO OPEN BANKING: GIVING
CUSTOMERS CHOICE, CONVENIENCE AND CONFIDENCE 72 (Dec. 2017) [hereinafter THE
TREASURY (AUSTL.), REVIEW INTO OPEN BANKING], https://treasury.gov.au/sites/de
fault/files/2019-03/Review-into-Open-Banking-_For-web-1.pdf.
16. See BASEL COMM., REPORT ON OPEN BANKING, supra note 7, at 9
(acknowledging, however, that both techniques still pose risks to the customer because
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The underlying concerns around screen scraping or reverse-engineering
have led banks to introduce their application programming interfaces
(“APIs”) — a standardized communication method that enables data flow
between systems in a seamless yet controlled way.17 The degree of openness
of these interfaces may vary, such as the level of protection, the bank’s duty
towards clients, and the bank’s ability to compete with outside developers.18
Banks lacking budgets and expertise to develop their APIs may instead
engage data aggregators as middlemen by contracts.19
B. Rationales for Data Sharing: Benefits and Concerns
Data sharing presents advantages and disadvantages for different
stakeholders in the financial industry. An advantage is that it could give
consumers more control over when and what data is shared with third parties
— be they banks, other financial institutions, or Fintech start-ups — in search
of better, personalized deals, thereby improving personal finance decisions.20
Examples are countless. The platform of Akoni, a British firm, helps
companies maximize the return on their deposits and provides personalized
cash tips and benchmarks reflecting similarly sized companies.21 By making
the market transparent and increasing the variety of choices available, data
sharing helps reshape the banking industry — at least in retail banking —
where clients often display “stickiness” to an incumbent due to switching

the data aggregator retains access to the customer’s account and may perform
unauthorized actions, such as engaging in a financial transaction).
17. Penny Crosman, Wells Fargo’s Bid to Vanquish Screen Scraping, AM. BANKER
(June 7, 2016, 6:30 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/wells-fargos-bid-tovanquish-screen-scraping (“APIs connect servers in a way that avoids all the problems
of screen scraping — the sharing of user names and passwords, the overloading of banks’
servers with high-volume requests, the inability to use two-factor authentication.”).
18. Lael Brainard, Governor, Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Speech at the Northwestern Kellogg
Public-Private Interface Conference on “New Developments in Consumer Finance:
Research & Practice”: Where Do Banks Fit in the Fintech Stack? (Apr. 28, 2017),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20170428a.htm.
19. Id.
20. See id. (suggesting that “screen scraping . . . may be the most effective tool for
the customers of small community banks to access the financial apps they prefer” and
thus, a necessary tool “to remain competitive until more effective broader industry
solutions are developed”).
21. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, AKONI, https://akonihub.com/static/faq
(last visited July 10, 2021).
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costs.22 Data sharing can, in other words, help fix the “lock-in” problem,23
addressing concerns that banks’ information monopoly can victimize
Fintech start-ups via anti-competitive practices.24 With better data access,
one report shows that Australians could save up to $11.6 billion AUD
annually by switching service providers.25 Another benefit is that the
“growth in volume, variety, and sources of data” can reduce barriers to entry,
this is particularly advantageous for new firms with innovative plans for this
novel information.”26
As promising as data sharing can be, however, there are concerns around
the current practice. First, it is not uncommon for banks to overlook the
opportunities that come with data sharing and instead perceive it as a threat
to their fundamental values,27 raising concerns that they would be recast as
an involuntary “platform as a service” (“PaaS”) provider and compelled to
face fiercer competition to maintain their clients.28 Incumbents are also
concerned with the level playing field: what are the obligations imposed onto
these Fintech start-ups when traditional banks are forced or “nudged” to

22. See Alasdair Smith, CMA Inquiry Chair, Speech at the BBA Retail Banking
Conference on Competition and Open Banking (June 29, 2017), https://www.gov.uk/
government/speeches/alasdair-smith-on-competition-and-open-banking (explaining the
difficulties consumers may have accessing information and how “opening banking” can
help remedy this information gap).
23. Giuseppe Colangelo & Oscar Borgogno, Data, Innovation and Transatlantic
Competition in Finance: The Case of the Access to Account Rule 7 (Stanford — Vienna
Transatlantic Tech. L. F., EU Law Working Papers, Paper No. 35, 2018) (explaining
“lock-in problems” and their effect on the banking industry).
24. AUSTL. GOV’T PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, REP. NO. 82, DATA AVAILABILITY AND
USE 567 (2017) [hereinafter PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N (AUSTL.), DATA AVAILABILITY AND
USE] (noting that data sharing “would almost certainly” encourage efficient competition
to the benefit of consumers); Colangelo & Borgogno, supra note 23, at 10 (“[F]ront-end
providers are more prone to be victims of anti-competitive practices carried out by banks
and other incumbents than end-to-end providers.”).
25. PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N (AUSTL.), DATA AVAILABILITY AND USE, supra note
24, at 101.
26. Id. at 553.
27. See ACCENTURE, THE BRAVE NEW WORLD OF OPEN BANKING 5 (2018); Daniel
Ziffer, Open Banking Will Threaten the Dominance of the Big Four Banks — But It Has
Been Delayed, ABC NEWS, (Dec. 20, 2019, 8:27 PM), https://www.abc.net.au/news/
2019-12-20/open-banking-revolution-to-shake-up-the-dominance-of-big-four/118134
98.
28. See Colangelo & Borgogno, supra note 23, at 21 (explaining different ways
“banks are likely to [fiercely] compete . . . to attract as many new customers and thirdparty providers as possible”); Jane K. Winn, Reengineering European Payment Law 27
(June 30, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pape
rs.cfm?abstract_id=3412457 (explaining the disadvantages to banks resulting from being
classified as PaaS providers).
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assume this new role as a PaaS provider?29 Second, while screen scraping
or reverse-engineering represents a less costly approach for third parties to
access consumers’ data, these techniques have pitfalls from a technical
perspective. Screen scraping, for instance, does not guarantee data accuracy
or currency, as banks may reconfigure their settings from time to time.
Moreover, the data collected by third parties could be stolen or misused
for payment fraud.30 Banks may find it problematic to distinguish between
consumers, aggregators, and unauthorized third parties when someone logs
onto the account.31 These practices could also arguably burden a bank’s IT
system by extracting a large amount of data.32 Other concerns are
cybersecurity,33 data breach (e.g., whether the third parties can pass the
information to fourth parties and beyond),34 and of course, the allocation of
liability arising from unauthorized transactions.35 Furthermore, while many
jurisdictions do not explicitly ban screen scraping or reverse engineering,
these techniques have, as a matter of practice, created controversy in various
jurisdictions — American Airlines, Inc. v. FareChase, Inc.36 and eBay, Inc.
v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc.37 in the United States, 38 and Ryanair Ltd. v Bravofly39
29. Winn, supra note 28, at 27.
30. BASEL COMM., REPORT ON OPEN BANKING, supra note 7, at 9.
31. Id. (acknowledging that this is done when third parties store customer

credentials, thus giving them access to the customer’s account).
32. Id. (noting that the third-party data aggregators may “extract large volumes of
data at multiple intervals”).
33. See, e.g., ASIC CONSULTATION PAPER 20, supra note 8, at 46 (referring to one
U.S. commentator’s report that appropriate agreements should be signed between banks
and data aggregators to address privacy and security concerns).
34. BASEL COMM., REPORT ON OPEN BANKING, supra note 7, at 12 (cautioning that
third parties may use or share the customer’s information beyond the scope of the
customer’s consent).
35. Id. at 14 (stating that liability laws may be unable to properly determine liability
in an open banking or data sharing dispute).
36. Temporary Injunction at 2–4, Am. Airlines, Inc. v. FareChase, Inc., No. 067194022-02 (67th Dist. Ct. Tarrant Cty., Tex. Mar. 8, 2003).
37. 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
38. One recurring issue in the United States is whether the trespass-to-chattels
doctrine would apply to screen scraping. Temporary Injunction at 4, Am. Airlines, Inc.,
No. 067-194022-02 (granting a temporary injunction to ban, among others, Farechase
from using software to obtain and copy data from American Airlines’ system); eBay,
Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1063–65 (moving for a preliminary injunction to prevent
Bidder’s Edge from further accessing eBay’s system after Bidder’s Edge accessed it
approximately 100,000 times a day). For a comparative study of the legality of screen
scraping in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, see generally HanWei Liu, Two Decades of Laws and Practice Around Screen Scraping in the Common
Law World and its Open Banking Watershed Moment, 30 WASH. INT’L L.J. 28 (2020).
39. Ryanair Ltd v. Bravofly [2009] IEHC 224. Ryanair claimed, among others, that
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in Ireland, are cases in point.
C. A Snapshot of Global Normative Diffusion of Open Banking: EU and
Beyond
The EU was the first jurisdiction mandating access to account data by
Directive 2015/2366 on Payment Services in the Internal Market — known
as PSD II.40 EU Member States were required to transpose the PSD II into
national law by January 13, 2018.41 To date, all EU Members have acted
accordingly.42 PSD II was built on its predecessor, the first Payment Systems
Directive (“PSD I”),43 adopted in 2007 as the foundation to establish safer
and more innovative payment services across the single market.44 The
revisions by PSD II represents an effort to adapt to the evolving technology
in the payment services market and its associated challenges.
PSD II applies to all payment service providers (“PSPs”); it is a broad term
that encompasses both banks and various third parties providing selected
financial services (including account information and payment initiation
services).45 It obliges banks to provide a customer’s data to authorized third
parties in specified circumstances.46 Such third parties are either Payment
Initiation Service Providers (“PISPs”)47 or Account Information Service
Providers (“AISPs”),48 collectively known as Third-Party Providers
(“TPPs”). Generally, PISPs expedite online transactions by allowing
consumers to directly execute an online payment from their accounts and
offer cost-effective solutions for both merchants and consumers.49 For
example, Banked is a UK-authorized fintech company50 that allows a
Bravofly’s practice of screen-scraping breaches Ireland’s Trademarks Act and the
Copyright and Related Rights Act and violated the terms and conditions of using
Ryanair’s website.
40. Directive (EU) 2015/2366, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25
November 2015 on Payment Services in the Internal Market, 2015 O.J. (L 337) 35.
41. Id. art. 109 at 111.
42. Payment Services (PSD2) — Transposition Status, EUR. CMM’N, https://ec.europ
a.eu/info/publications/payment-services-directive-transposition-status_en (last updated
May 5, 2021).
43. Directive 2007/64/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13
November 2007 on Payment Services in the Internal Market, 2007 O.J. (L 319) 1.
44. Id. recital 4 at 1.
45. PSD II, supra note 1, arts. 1, 4(3), 4(11), annex I, at 53–54, 57, 116.
46. Id. arts. 2, 66–67 at 54, 92–93.
47. Id. art. 66 at 92–93.
48. Id. art. 67 at 93.
49. Id. art. 4 at 57–60; id. recital 28 at 39.
50. Financial Services Register, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., https://register.fca.org.
uk/s/firm?id=0010X00004EMNS0QAP (last visited July 10, 2021).
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merchant to share its financial details and request payment, with the
customer then authorizing this transfer of funds.51 AISPs consolidate data
across different clients’ accounts, giving them a better overview of their
financial situation.52 This can help facilitate the development of other
services in the Fintech ecosystem53 — for example, Bippit compiles a
customer’s information and shares it with a financial adviser so they can
advise clients virtually.54 Due to their different functions, PISPs are often
described as having “read-write” access, while AISPs have “read-only”
access.55
Central to the PSD II is consent: for a TPP to access a customer’s data (or
“payment service user”), it must obtain their explicit consent.56 Upon
receiving the customer’s consent, the bank must securely communicate with
the PISP or AISP to provide the necessary data,57 regardless of whether they
have a pre-existing contractual relationship with that TPP.58 Therefore, the
framework empowers bank customers to retrieve their data as easily as they
can access the funds in their accounts, making it available to Fintech firms
in exchange for new services.59
By freeing up data, PSD II is the first regime that definitively opens up the
payment services market to TPPs other than banks.60 The underlying
rationale is, as mentioned above, to increase competition in the industry by

51. David Kimberly, Faster, Safer: Payments Under Open Banking, FIN. MAGNATES
(Aug. 16, 2019, 11:01 AM), https://www.financemagnates.com/fintech/payments/faste
r-safer-payments-under-open-banking/.
52. PSD II, supra note 1, recital 28, art. 4, at 39, 53–54 (defining and explaining the
technology that gives customers an overview of their financial situation).
53. 8 Frequently Asked Questions About Account Information Service Providers,
FINTEC SYS. (Oct. 5, 2018), https://knowledge.fintecsystems.com/en/blog/8-frequentlyasked-questions-about-account-information-service-providers (describing AISPs and
their impact on the Fintech Industry).
54. How It Works, BIPPIT, https://bippit.com/how-it-works/ (last visited July 13,
2021).
55. THE TREASURY (AUSTL.), REVIEW INTO OPEN BANKING, supra note 15, at 2, 108;
Kelly Read-Parish, Open Banking: AISPs and PISPs Explained, FINEXTRA (Feb. 11,
2019), https://www.finextra.com/blogposting/16647/open-banking-aisps-and-pisps-exp
lained.
56. PSD II, supra note 1, art. 64(1) at 91.
57. Id. arts. 66–67 at 92–93; see also infra Part III.B.
58. PSD II, supra note 1, arts. 66(5), 67(4) at 92–93.
59. Fernando Zunzunegui, Digitalisation of Payment Services 16 (Ibero-American
Inst. for L. & Fin., Working Paper No. 5/2018, 2018) (noting that access to this data can
be quite valuable for customers).
60. PSD II has gone further than PSD I by permitting non-bank firms to use not only
“payment institution” status, but also “PISP” or “AISP” status. Id. at 24–25.
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bringing innovative players into the market.61 Also, PSD II addresses some
of the concerns around data sharing examined earlier: it can create a more
integrated payment market with common standards, increase the safety and
security of payments, and protect consumer data in an Open Banking system
where self-regulation may be insufficient.62
In implementing PSD II, the UK was the first to offer a governmental
program to work toward Open Banking.63 Her Majesty’s Treasury in 2015
announced its commitment to delivering an open standard for APIs and data
sharing in the UK retail banking sector to increase the opportunities for
competition, thereby improving outcomes for customers in the banking
industry.64 This implementation was achieved in 2018 by the Retail Banking
Market Investigation Order 2017,65 issued by the Competition and Markets
Authority (“CMA”).66 This CMA Order applies to the nine largest banks in
the UK,67 requiring them to make certain data available via an API to
authorized third parties.68
While these European initiatives may represent the “cradle of Open
Banking,” the practice has since been adopted in other jurisdictions in their
forms.69 The most notable example is Australia, which recently rolled out
61. See European Parliament Adopts European Commission Proposal to Create
Safer and More Innovative European Payments, EUR. CMM’N (Oct. 8, 2015) [hereinafter
EUR. COMM’N, Safter and More Innovative European Payments], https://ec.europa.
eu/commission/presscorner/detail/ro/IP_15_5792 (stating that these innovations will
provide protection for European customers); OPEN BANKING IMPLEMENTATION ENTITY,
OPEN BANKING: GUIDELINES FOR OPEN DATA PARTICIPANTS 3 (2018) [hereinafter OBIE,
GUIDELINES FOR OPEN DATA PARTICIPANTS], https://www.openbanking.org.uk/wp-cont
ent/uploads/Guidelines-for-Open-Data-Participants.pdf (detailing how open banking
operates to bring new players into the market).
62. See Zunzunegui, supra note 59, at 27; EUR. COMM’N, Safer and More Innovative
European Payments, supra note 61 (outlining changes to the regulations brought by PSD
II).
63. Zunzunegui, supra note 59, at 15.
64. HM TREASURY (U.K.), DATA SHARING AND OPEN DATA IN BANKING: RESPONSE
TO THE CALL FOR EVIDENCE 7 (2015) (concluding that given the noted benefits the
government is “commit[ed] to deliver[ing] and open API standard in UK banking”).
65. Retail Banking Market Investigation: The Retail Banking Market Investigation
Order 2017 (UK) [hereinafter UK CMA Order].
66. Id. § 2.9.
67. Id. § 3.1.1 (listing RBSG, LBG, Barclays, HSBCG, Nationwide, Santander,
Danske, Bol, and AIBG as the nine largest UK banks).
68. Id. § 2; Third Party Providers, OBIE [hereinafter OBIE, Third Party Providers],
https://www.openbanking.org.uk/providers/third-party-providers/ (last visited Apr. 24,
2021) (detailing the steps required to become a provider); see also infra Part III.A–B.
69. See EMEA Center for Regulatory Strategy, Open Banking Around the World,
DELOITTE, https://www2.deloitte.com/global/en/pages/financial-services/articles/openbanking-around-the-world.html (last visited July 13, 2021) (summarizing open banking
models outside of the EU and noting there are two general categories: “market-driven”
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its Open Banking regime as part of the broader Consumer Data Right
(“CDR”). CDR is unique because it is broadly framed as a data policy
initiative rather than a financial service one,70 and while it will apply first to
banks, it will gradually be rolled out to the whole economy. 71
The regime was passed on August 1, 2019, in the Treasury Laws
Amendment (Consumer Data Right) Act 2019 (Cth) (“CDR Act”).72
However, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
(“ACCC”) pushed back its roll-out from February to July 2020 as a result of
incomplete tests.73 The CDR roll-out emerged as a response to several
reviews, including one by the Australian Productivity Commission in 201774
and one by the Farrell Review in the same year.75 Notably, CDR works
towards a comprehensive data access regime, furthering the existing data
access rules set forth under the Australian Privacy Principles (“APPs”).76
Among others, the regime requires data-holders (e.g., banks) to securely
transfer a customer’s data, upon request, to an accredited third party. Like
its UK/EU counterpart, CDR intends to encourage competition, enhance
consumer welfare, reduce switching costs, and enable a range of business
opportunities to emerge from data sharing.77
or “regulatory-driven”).
70. Id. (noting that as a data policy initiative, it could be implemented in any industry
of the economy).
71. Explanatory Memorandum, Treasury Laws Amendment (Consumer Data Right)
Bill 2019 (Cth) 5, 7 (Austl.) [hereinafter Explanatory Memorandum, CDR Bill]
(emphasizing the Government’s dedication to applying CDR across various sectors of
the economy, such as “the energy and telecommunications sectors”).
72. This Act amended the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (Austl.),
Australian Information Commissioner Act 2010 (Cth), and Privacy Act 1988 (Cth)
(Austl.) to create the Consumer Data Right.
73. Press Release, Austl. Competition & Consumer Comm’n, Consumer Data Right
Timeline Update (Dec. 20, 2019) [hereinafter ACCC, CDR Timeline Update],
https://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/consumer-data-right-timeline-update (citing the
ACCC’s dedication to ensuring a user-friendly system and “robust privacy protection”
as the reason for postponing the launch).
74. PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N (AUSTL.), DATA AVAILABILITY AND USE, supra note 24,
at 35 (recommending the creation of an economy-wide Consumer Data Right).
75. THE TREASURY (AUSTL.), REVIEW INTO OPEN BANKING, supra note 15, at 11, 13–
14 (recommending that Open Banking be implemented through the broader CDR
framework). A Senate Committee is also currently conducting an inquiry into the future
direction of the CDR framework, including potential “write-access” in the banking sector
(for payment initiation) and roll-out to the superannuation sector. SENATE SELECT
COMM. ON FIN. TECH. & REGUL. TECH., PARLIAMENT OF AUSTRALIA, ISSUES PAPER 9
(2019).
76. See infra Part III.B.
77. Explanatory Memorandum, CDR Bill, supra note 71, at 5 (outlining the aims and
values of the CDR).
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Conceptually, the approaches adopted by different jurisdictions fall within
one of the following camps. Some of them — like the EU, UK, and
Australian schemes — follow the mandatory (or prescriptive) approach by
laying down a comprehensive framework of Open Banking.78 Others take
the voluntary (or facilitative) model via guidelines, standards, and technical
specifications on APIs to assist data sharing.79 The “Finance-as-a-Service:
API Playbook” issued by the Monetary Authority of Singapore and the
Association of Banks in Singapore,80 and the “Open API Framework for the
Hong Kong Banking Sector” released by Hong Kong Monetary Authority,81
are prime examples. Still, in other jurisdictions, there is currently no
regulatory framework to mandate or facilitate Open Banking, although there
has been discussion on the subject. In the United States, for instance, it is
heatedly debated as to whether Section 1033 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act can serve as a vehicle to require
financial institutions to share consumer data with TPPs.82 With this
backdrop, we now turn to examine the regulatory approaches dealing with
specific concerns around data sharing in the UK and Australia below.
III. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF AUSTRALIA AND THE UK
A. Who Can Participate?
In the UK, the CMA Order applies to the nine largest banks — known as
the “CMA9” — requiring them to make certain data available through an

78. BASEL COMM., REPORT ON OPEN BANKING, supra note 7, at 11–12 (describing
the mandatory and formal nature of the EU, UK, and Australian frameworks).
79. Id. (highlighting Hong Kong and Singapore as examples of countries employing
the facilitative model).
80. ASS’N OF BANKS & MONETARY AUTH. OF SINGAPORE, FINANCE-AS-A-SERVICE:
API PLAYBOOK (2016).
81. HK MONETARY AUTH., OPEN API FRAMEWORK FOR THE HONG KONG BANKING
SECTOR (2018) (detailing the regulatory framework set for the Hong Kong banking
sector).
82. See, e.g., Michael S. Barr et al., Consumer Autonomy and Pathways to
Portability in Banking and Financial Services 3 (Ctr. on Fin., Law & Policy, Univ. Mich.
Working Paper No. 01, 2019), http://financelawpolicy.umich.edu/files/umich-cflp-work
ing-paper-consumer-autonomy-and-data-portability-pathways-Nov-3.pdf
(“Section
1033 of the Dodd-Frank Act grants consumers the right to access their personal financial
information. But there is significant dispute about the scope of § 1033 . . . .”); Mary
Wisniewski, The Data Access Debate Is About to Get A Lot More Interesting, AM.
BANKER (Jan. 27, 2017, 3:27 PM), https:/www.americanbanker.com/news/the-dataaccess-debate-is-about-to-get-a-lot-more-interesting (noting that some interpret § 1033
as only “contemplate[ing] a direct relationship between a customer and bank” while
others argue that it “codif[ies] consumers’ right to access their financial data through
third-party apps”).
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API.83 Non-CMA9 providers may also voluntarily participate in Open
Banking. To access data via the banks’ APIs, TPPs must be eligible under
the PSD II so they can obtain authorization from the Financial Conduct
Authority (“FCA”).84 Upon being granted such regulatory permission, TPPs
are placed on a “whitelist” — known as the Open Banking Directory, as
maintained by the Open Banking Implementation Entity (“OBIE”),85 to
provide services using Open Banking.86
In Australia, the CDR regime will apply to, in the case of the banking
sector, all authorized deposit taking institutions (“ADIs”) other than foreign
banks. 87 However, implementation will be phased in, with trials by the four
largest banks — ANZ, Commonwealth, Westpac, and NAB.88 These major
banks are required to provide access to customer data under the CDR by July
2020;89 other ADIs must do so by July 2021.90 Moreover, to receive such
data, TPPs must become “Accredited Recipients”91 by meeting certain
criteria, including privacy and security requirements.92
B. What Data Should Be Shared?
The scope of data sharing may vary depending on jurisdiction. Under the
UK’s “Read-Only Data Standard,” participating banks must release and
make freely available both “reference information” and “product

83. The CMA9 are listed in the UK CMA Order as Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds,
Nationwide, RBSG, BoI, AIB, Santander, and Danske. UK CMA Order, supra note 65,
§ 3.1.1.
84. See Frequently Asked Questions, BANK OF APIS, https://www.bankofapis.com/
faq (last visited July 13, 2021).
85. OBIE, Third Party Providers, supra note 68.
86. OBIE, GUIDELINES FOR OPEN DATA PARTICIPANTS, supra note 61, at 5.
87. Consumer Data Right (Authorised Deposit-Taking Institutions) Designation
2019 (Cth) (Austl.) [hereinafter CDR Banking Instrument].
88. Competition and Consumer (Consumer Data Right) Rules 2019 (Cth), sch 3 pt 6
(Austl.) [hereinafter Consumer Data Rules].
89. ACCC, CDR Timeline Update, supra note 73.
90. ACCC Consultation on Proposed Timetable for Participation of Non-major
ADIs in the CDR, AUSTL. COMPETITION & CONSUMER CMM’N (Feb. 7, 2020),
https://www.accc.gov.au/focus-areas/consumer-data-right-cdr-0/accc-consultation-onproposed-timetable-for-participation-of-non-major-adis-in-the-cdr.
91. Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 56BD(1)(b) (Austl.) [hereinafter
Competition and Consumer Act].
92. See generally AUSTL. COMPETITION & CONSUMER CMM’N, DRAFT, CONSUMER
DATA RIGHT SUPPLEMENTARY ACCREDITATION GUIDELINES: INFORMATION SECURITY
(Sep. 23, 2019) [hereinafter ACCC, CDR SUPPLEMENTARY GUIDELINES: INFORMATION
SECURITY],
https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/CDR%20draft%20supplementary
%20accreditation%20guidelines%20-%20information%20security.pdf; infra Part III.D.
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information.”93 The former includes all branch locations and opening hours,
and ATM locations.94 “Product information” covers prices, charges/interest
rates, features and benefits, terms and conditions, and customer eligibility
criteria for a wide range of products — including both personal and business
current accounts, as well as lending products for small and medium
enterprises.95 “Service quality indicators” — results from customer surveys
relating to the likelihood that they would recommend them to someone else
— must also be shared.96 The UK’s framework also regulates data-sharing
from a payment account97 that is related to a specific consumer: in this type
of data sharing, the bank must allow a TPP to access the data that is necessary
to perform that TPP’s service (excluding any data that is considered
“sensitive” in that it can be used to commit fraud, e.g., personal security
credentials).98 This ensures that AISPs can access a customer’s account
information and transaction history,99 while PISPs can access information
regarding the initiation and execution of payment transactions.100 Such
interactions are caught by the PSD II even where they are “one leg out” (only
one party is located within the EU), extending the geographical scope beyond
the previous PSD (applied only to interactions taking place entirely within
the EU).101 Thus, in contrast to the CDR framework, which sometimes
considers the nationality of the data subject (see below), the PSD II regime
simply applies where one or both of the PSPs involved are located within the
EU.102
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

UK CMA Order, supra note 65, § 10.1.
Id. § 12.1.1.
Id. § 12.1.2.
Id. §§ 13, 15.
FCA Handbook: The Perimeter Guidance Manual, 8 Fin. Conduct Auth. § 15.3
(June 2021).
98. Zunzunegui, supra note 59, at 17; Commission Delegated Regulation (EU)
2018/389, of 27 November 2017 Supplementing Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the
European Parliament and of the Council with Regard to Regulatory Technical Standards
for Strong Customer Authentication and Common and Secure Open Standards of
Communication, art. 36(1) 2018 O.J. (L 69) 23, 41 [hereinafter RTS].
99. RTS, supra note 98, art. 36(1)(a) at 41.
100. Id. art. 36(1)(b)–(c) at 41.
101. PSD II, supra note 1, art. 2(1)–(2) at 54; Q&As: Geographical Scope of
Application of the RTS on Strong Customer Authentication (SCA) and Secure
Communication Requirements — Two-leg Transactions, EUR. BANKING AUTH. (Sep. 6,
2019),
https://eba.europa.eu/single-rule-book-qa/-/qna/view/publicId/2018_4030;
DEUTSCHE BANK, PAYMENT SERVICES DIRECTIVE 2: DIRECTIVE ON PAYMENT SERVICES
IN THE INTERNAL MARKET “(EU) 2015/2366” 12 (2016) [hereinafter DEUTSCHE BANK,
PAYMENT SERVICES DIRECTIVE 2], https://cib.db.com/docs_new/White_Paper_
Payments_Services_Directive_2.pdf.
102. See DEUTSCHE BANK, PAYMENT SERVICES DIRECTIVE 2, supra note 101, at 12.
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In Australia, “CDR data” is broadly framed under the CDR Act to include
information within a class specified by a designating instrument, extending
to those wholly or partly derived from such information.103 In the banking
sector, more specifically, it refers to three classes of information:
“information about [a] user of [a] product” (e.g., information identifying the
person), “information about use of [a] product” (e.g., information about a
transaction made by the person), and “information about a product” (e.g.,
price, feature, and terms and conditions associated with the product).104 CDR
data can be roughly split into two categories, product data and consumer
data, with only the latter specific to consumers. It is noteworthy that CDR
data is qualified by geographical limitations. Generally, for data to be CDR
data, it must have been generated or collected in Australia by an Australian
person; or been generated or collected in Australia and related to an
Australian person; or been generated or collected outside Australia by an
Australian person and related to an Australian person.105 Interestingly,
access to CDR data is also currently limited to read-only privileges,
contrasting to the PSD II regime’s allowances for both read-only access (by
AISPs) and read-write access (that is, payment initiation by PISPs).106
By Open Banking, the UK and Australia both extend the scope of data that
is subject to access. The UK Data Protection Act 2018 features the “right to
portability” as required under Article 20 of the General Data Protection
Regulation (“GDPR”) and makes it an offense for a controller to alter or
destroy information to prevent such disclosure.107 Although this right was
set to further strengthen the control over a data subject’s own data,108 it is
qualified by the fact that it applies only to “personal information” —
information that relates to that identifiable person — and only that which
was “provided” to the controller by the consumer.109 By contrast, data access
under the PSD II and PSR is not limited to data that is “personal” and extends
beyond data provided by the consumer. As mentioned above, for instance,
banks must publicly release reference/product data and service quality
103. Competition and Consumer Act, supra note 91, s 56AI (defining CDR data to
include both data directly and indirectly derived from all other CDR data).
104. CDR Banking Instrument, supra note 87, ss 6–8.
105. Competition and Consumer Act, supra note 91, s 56 AC(3).
106. THE TREASURY (AUSTL.), REVIEW INTO OPEN BANKING, supra note 15, 93–94
(contrasting PSD II’s requirements with CDR’s).
107. Data Protection Act 2018, c. 12, § 172(3).
108. Regulation (EU) 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27
April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal
data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General
Data Protection Regulation) art. 20(1), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 45 [hereinafter GDPR].
109. Id.
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indicators under the UK’s additional Read-Only Standard.110 The PSD II
regime hence widens the scope of data access beyond that of the GDPR, with
each approach more in line with its respective purpose. While the GDPR
aims to further strengthen the control of data subjects over their own data,
the PSD II also seeks to facilitate innovation and development of new
Fintech services.111
Likewise, CDR expands the scope of data access established under
Australian Privacy Principle 12 (“APP 12”). While the data access right
under APP 12 is similarly qualified by “personal information,”112 it is even
more limited than its EU/UK counterpart. For instance, while the Federal
Court of Australia recently in its decision of Privacy Commissioner v Telstra
Corp.113 interpreted the term “personal information” to have two conditions
— (1) it must be “about an individual” and (2) identity is “apparent, or can
reasonably be ascertained, from the information or opinion” — it offers
limited guidance on when information would be considered to be “about an
individual.”114 The lack of clear instructions arguably narrows the scope of
application of APP 12.115 Furthermore, APP 12 does not apply to most small
businesses — those with an annual financial turnover of no more than $3
million AUD.116 The CDR regime could address these pitfalls: it now
provides access to a far greater range of information by using “consumer
data” rather than “personal information” as a basis.117
Further, consumer data is broadly framed as covering information that is

110. UK CMA Order, supra note 65, §§ 12–17.
111. See Sophie Wijdeveld, PSD2 Innovation and GDP Protection: A Fintech

Balancing Act, Part One: Consent, CLIFFORD CHANCE (Oct. 18, 2019), https://talking
tech.cliffordchance.com/en/data-cyber/data/psd2-innovation-and-gdpr-protection--a-fin
tech-balancing-act.html (“[P]ayment services providers need to balance the innovative
opportunities offered by [PSD II] with the data protection challenges created by
GDPR.”).
112. Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) sch 1 pt 5 s 12.1 (Austl.).
113. Priv Comm’r v Telstra Corp (2017) 249 FCR 24 (Austl.).
114. Id. at 30, 63. The Court stated that this assessment requires an “evaluative
conclusion” and depends on the facts of the case. Uncertainty thus remains as to what
constitutes information “about an individual” and is therefore potentially “personal
information.” M Feltham, Privacy Commissioner v Telstra Corp Ltd 14 PRIV. L. BULL.
42 (2017).
115. JAMES MEESE ET AL., CONSUMER RIGHTS TO PERSONAL DATA: DATA ACCESS IN
THE COMMUNICATIONS SECTOR 28 (2019) (noting that the term “personal information”
is too narrow to include all of the relevant consumer data and may result in a
“confusing . . . system of data rights”).
116. Privacy Act 1988, supra note 112, s 6D.
117. See MEESE ET AL., supra note 115, at 1 (calling for Australia to adopt a reform
like the EU’s GDPR).
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“directly” or “indirectly” derived from other CDR data.118 The latter
arguably captures the data that has been re-organized, created, or otherwise
value-added from “base” data. This may be worrying for industry
stakeholders, as it could breach intellectual property rights,119 reducing
incentives to invest in data.120 Consequently, information that has been
“materially enhanced” is excluded from the scope of the data access rule. In
the designation instrument issued for the banking industry, more specifically,
“materially enhanced information” refers to data derived from product use
data (source material) that has undergone “insight or analysis,” which
“render[s] the information significantly more valuable than the source
material” by enhancing its “usefulness, usability or commercial value.”121
The exemption does not apply, however, in some circumstances — for
instance, if it is publicly available, or disclosure is otherwise required by
law.122 Certain credit information like court proceeding information,
personal insolvency, or serious credit infringement is explicitly excluded
from the scope of disclosure.123
While significant expansions to the scope of data access have thus been
made, there are plans in both nations to extend this even further. The UK’s
Smart Data Initiative will apply similar data sharing across the “regulated
markets” (e.g., utilities, communications, rail, and financial services)124 and
118. Competition and Consumer Act, supra note 91, s 56AI (1)–(2).
119. In the context of EU/UK, in particular, this can also turn on the clash between

the Open Banking initiative and the sui generis “database right” contained in article 7(1)
of Directive 96/9/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996
on the Legal Protection of Databases 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20; transposed by regulations 13
and 14 of The Copyright and Rights in Databases Regulations 1997, SI 1997/3032. No
such right exists in Australia, where databases may only be protected if they fall under
general copyright law. See IceTV Pty Ltd v Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd (2009) 239
CLR 458.
120. See THE TREASURY (AUSTL.), REVIEW INTO OPEN BANKING, supra note 15, at
36–38 (arguing that obliging data holders to share their “value-added” data may in fact
have negative impacts on investment, intellectual property, and commercial agreements
and recommending that this type of data not be included within Open Banking).
121. CDR Banking Instrument, supra note 87, s 10(1). To set a clear standard, section
10(3) lists information that is “not materially enhanced information,” including, notably,
calculated balances, amount of interest earned or charged, and fees charged, among
others.
122. Id. s 10(2).
123. Id. s 9.
124. See Dep’t for Digit., Culture, Media & Sport, National Data Strategy, U.K.
GOV’T,
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-national-data-strategy/nat
ional-data-strategy (last updated Dec. 9, 2020); see also HM GOV’T (U.K.), NEXT STEPS
FOR SMART DATA: PUTTING CONSUMERS AND SMES IN CONTROL OF THEIR DATA AND
ENABLING INNOVATION 13 (2020) [hereinafter HM GOV’T (U.K.), NEXT STEPS FOR
SMART DATA].
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possibly the “digital market” (e.g., social media companies).125 While
Australia intends to apply its Consumer Data Right to the energy and
telecommunications
sectors
before
eventual
“economy-wide”
implementation.126
C. Who Should Bear Losses Caused?
Open Banking brings both benefits and risks. While data can be held and
used by more entities, this also entails more points of storage and stages in
which data could be compromised.127 Unauthorized128 or defective129
transactions therefore lead to issues of liability: which party bears the loss
resulting from fraudulent or erroneous activities?130 Previously, where
consumers shared their banking login credentials with data aggregators via
screen scraping, they were often responsible for losses arising from
unauthorized transactions.131 Such an issue becomes more problematic with

125. See HM GOV’T, NEXT STEPS FOR SMART DATA, supra note 124, at 17.
126. Explanatory Memorandum, CDR Bill, supra note 71, at 5, 7–8 (outlining the

stages of implementation).
127. THE TREASURY (AUSTL.), REVIEW INTO OPEN BANKING, supra note 15, at 50
(noting that more points of storage make it easier for the data to be hacked and more
transfers increase the risk that the data may be sent to the incorrect user); Trust in Open
Banking: Negotiating Data Liability Between Banks and TPPs, FINEXTRA (Nov. 22,
2019) [hereinafter, FINEXTRA, Trust in Open Banking], https://www.finextra.com/
newsarticle/34820/trust-in-open-banking-negotiating-data-liability-between-banks-andtpps (acknowledging the need to address “the threat of losing [data and ensuring it]
remains the central priority”).
128. An “unauthorized transaction” is a transaction made without the customer’s
consent. See, e.g., PSD II, supra note 1, art. 64(1) at 91 (“[A] payment transaction is
considered to be authori[z]ed only if the payer has given consent to execute the payment
transaction.”).
129. A “defective transaction” is a transaction “requested by the customer but
wrongly processed by the providers involved” (which may incur charges from the
intended recipient). INST. OF INT’L FIN., LIABILITY AND CONSUMER PROTECTION IN OPEN
BANKING 1 (2018), https://www.iif.com/portals/0/Files/private/32370132_liability_
and_consumer_protection_in_open_banking_091818.pdf.
130. See BASEL COMM., REPORT ON OPEN BANKING, supra note 7, at 14 (stating
regulatory frameworks and approaches to the issue of liability for data breaches);
Reinhard Steennot, Reduced Payer’s Liability for Unauthorised Payment Transactions
Under the Second Payment Services Directive (PSD2) 34(4) COMP. L & SEC. REV. 954,
957 (2018) (exploring liability issues arising from data sharing); INST. OF INT’L FIN.,
supra note 129, at 5 (noting that in countries like the United States, with no specific
regulatory framework for such liability issues, bilateral agreements will sometimes
dictate liability, otherwise the customer may have to resort to a civil suit).
131. See BASEL COMM., REPORT ON OPEN BANKING, supra note 7, at 14 (noting that
in the absence of a clear framework, when “customer-permissioned data” falls into the
hands of the wrong party, it is difficult to determine how much responsibility should fall
on the customer).
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multiple entities involved in the provision of services in the Open Banking
context: consumers, banks, TPPs and even fourth parties.132
Jurisdictions following the mandatory approach, such as the EU/UK, have
a dedicated framework to address these issues.133 Presumably, such rules
may overcome several challenges seen in jurisdictions with no specific
regulatory intervention — a consumer in the United States, for example, may
hope for a bilateral agreement between their banks and the third party for
dispute resolution, but in its absence, must rely solely on the civil liability
framework.134 Consumers under the latter system typically have to assume
the burden of proof by identifying which party may have made a mistake to
hold it accountable.135 The EU/UK liability regime, in contrast, reverses the
default setting by shifting the burden to service providers in several ways
and requiring that consumers receive a refund for their loss except in limited
circumstances (as discussed below).136
Likewise, in Australia, such allocation of responsibility was considered
“important for the proper functioning of Open Banking,”137 as clarifying the
liability for each party would “build community trust and confidence.”138 It
would also offer certainty for industry participants like data holders and data
recipients, and eliminate bilateral negotiations surrounding the liability risks
associated with Open Banking — although such a regime has not yet been
put in place in Australia.139 The Australian Treasury’s Review into Open
Banking contrasted this to market-driven attribution of liability, which could
result in less-informed parties accepting the associated risks as “buried in a
dense set of terms and conditions and therefore not readily understood and

132. Id. at 7, 14 (explaining that as more parties gain access to and share data,
identifying and assigning liability in the case of erroneously shared data becomes more
difficult).
133. See INST. OF INT’L FIN., supra note 129, at 3 (exemplifying the PSD II and its
guidelines as a regulation that provides rules on “liability conditions”).
134. Id. at 5.
135. Id. (calling out the “worst-case scenario,” in which case the information
necessary to meet this burden of proof is often “outside the consumer’s reach” and noting
that even once this burden is met, the consumer must carry litigation’s additional burdens
of time and expense).
136. Id. (explaining, for instance, that the EU requires professional indemnity
insurance, or its equivalent, for third parties accessing consumer account information and
that the bank must refund the consumer before requesting compensation from liable third
parties).
137. THE TREASURY (AUSTL.), REVIEW INTO OPEN BANKING, supra note 15, at 65.
138. Id.
139. Id. (emphasizing the importance of “consistency and transparency across all data
sharing arrangements . . . [to] provide certainty for customers on who bears the liability
for any losses”).
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genuinely agreed to.”140 Against this backdrop, we now turn to the substance
of such frameworks in the EU/UK and Australia.
i. EU/UK Model
In the UK, the liability framework is set forth under its Payment Services
Regulations 2017 (“PSR 2017”),141 which transposed the EU’s PSD II.142
Overall, PSR 2017 uses a rule of thumb whereby banks — termed Account
Servicing Payment Service Providers (“ASPSP”) — must immediately
reimburse the customer for the loss caused by an unauthorized transaction,
regardless of whether it occurred as a result of third-party access.143 This
does not apply where the bank “has reasonable grounds to suspect fraudulent
behavior” by the customer and fulfills the relevant notification obligation.144
Furthermore, per PSR 2017, if there is a deficiency when executing a
payment transaction (e.g., non-execution, late execution, incorrect
execution) and such payment was initiated through a TPP — specifically, a
PISP — it is the bank that will be liable.145 However, if the PISP is found to
be responsible for the unauthorized or deficiently executed transaction, it
must then compensate the bank.146 As a general rule, the burden will fall on
either the bank or TPP to show that the transaction was authenticated rather
than on customers to prove otherwise.147 Furthermore, both PISPs and
AISPs must have professional indemnity insurance (or a comparable
guarantee).148
The EU/UK regime articulates a set of interrelated obligations governing
the customers, banks, and TPPs concerning liability. Customers, termed
“payers” under PSR 2017, are obliged to notify their bank when they learn
an unauthorized transaction has taken place and wish to seek rectification.149
They must make such a notification “without undue delay” on becoming
aware of the transaction, and “in any event, no later than 13 months after the

140. Id.
141. Payment Services Regulations 2017, SI 2014/752 [hereinafter PSR].
142. Payment Services Regulations 2017 Explanatory Memorandum, c. 2,

Explanatory Notes ¶ 1.
143. PSD II, supra note 1, art. 73 at 96; PSR, supra note 141, art. 76; FINEXTRA, Trust
in Open Banking, supra note 127.
144. PSR, supra note 141, art. 76, ¶ 3.
145. PSD II, supra note 1, art. 73(2) at 96; PSR, supra note 141, art. 76, ¶ 5(a).
146. PSD II, supra note 1, art. 73(2) at 96; PSR, supra note 141, art. 76, ¶ 5(b), art.
95.
147. See, e.g., PSR, supra note 141, art. 75.
148. PSD II, supra note 1, art. 5(2)–(3) at 62; PSR, supra note 141, art. 6, ¶ 7(e)–(f).
149. PSD II, supra note 1, art. 71(1) at 96–97; PSR, supra note 141, art. 74, ¶ 1.
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debit date.”150 A logical consequence following customers’ failure to do so
would be — though not expressly spelled out in the regime — that they bear
all losses arising from unauthorized transactions (i.e., they lose their
statutory entitlement reimbursed by the bank).151 Further, it is less clear
whether a customer can get their account rectified if he or she has “undue
delay” — a term left undefined — in making such notification within the
prescribed 13 month timeframe.152
Relatedly, while it is not clear whether a customer should also contact the
TPP, the foregoing notification duty will, as a matter of practice, effectively
make the bank the first contact.153 Questions continue to go unanswered:
should the bank then pass this information onto the TPP for investigation
upon receiving a notification from customers? What can and should be done
by the bank while the TPP investigates the unauthorized transaction?
Although the PSR 2017 appears silent on these issues, the FCA has stated
that the bank and TPP are permitted to have voluntary arrangements to settle
such liabilities.154
A more difficult question arises if both the bank and TPP deny any
wrongdoing after the notification. While it is clear here that customers
would not be caught in the middle — they will be reimbursed by the bank
anyway, no matter who would be ultimately liable — it is less obvious as to
the allocation of burden of proof between banks and TPPs. The FCA has
clarified, in terms of payments initiated via a TPP, that the burden “lies with

150. PSR, supra note 141, art. 74, ¶ 1; see PSD II, supra note 1, art. 71(1) at 96–97.
151. However, this issue is not entirely clear and there has been no specific guidance

from the EU nor from the FCA. Kai Zhang, Payer Liability under PSD2 — Unintended
Complexity? BRYAN CAVE LEIGHTON PAISNER (June 27, 2019), https://www.bclplaw.
com/en-US/thought-leadership/payer-liability-under-psd2-unintended-complexity.html
(reasoning that this allocation of liability encourages customers to timely report any
unauthorized payment transaction).
152. Steennot, supra note 130, at 116 (observing that “it remains unclear whether the
payer can still obtain rectification if he [was] notified [of] the unauthorized transaction
within 13 months, but not without undue delay after becoming aware of the unauthorized
transaction”).
153. See Open Banking, Open Liability: Accountability Issues for Open Banking
APIs, ASHURST (Feb. 28, 2018) [hereinafter Open Banking, Open Liability],
https://www.ashurst.com/en/news-and-insights/legal-updates/open-banking-open-liabili
ty-accountability-issues-for-open-banking-apis/ (questioning whether it is the best
practice for banks to serve as the refund point of contact, especially “where there is a
direct interaction between TPP and the customer”).
154. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., PAYMENT SERVICES AND ELECTRONIC MONEY — OUR
APPROACH. THE FCA’S ROLE UNDER THE PAYMENT SERVICES REGULATIONS 2017 AND
THE ELECTRONIC MONEY REGULATIONS 2011 122, 139 (2019) [hereinafter FCA
APPROACH DOCUMENT], https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/finalised-guidance/fcaapproach-payment-services-electronic-money-2017.pdf.
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the PISP to show that it was not responsible for the error.” 155 The PISP thus
needs to show that the payment order was correctly handled within its
“sphere of influence” — that is, the parts of the transaction over which the
PISP has control.156 Nevertheless, what would trigger this “sphere of
influence” expression remains unclear in practice.157
If, on the other hand, the loss or misappropriation of the payment
instrument was traced to the customer, that customer would be liable for
losses up to a maximum of £35.158 Yet, customers would assume full liability
for losses — without a cap — if they have acted fraudulently, or otherwise
intentionally, or with gross negligence breached the obligations159
concerning the use of the payment instrument160 and the safe-keeping of
security credentials.161 Some intriguing issues emerge from this context.
First, what yardsticks are used to assess “detectability”? Second, how is the
notion of “gross negligence” interpreted in this context? On the former, PSR
2017 and PSD II are largely silent, thus leaving room for debate in
practice.162 On the latter, PSD II in its recitals makes clear that “gross
negligence” must be more than a mere breach of a duty of care; rather, it
refers to conduct that exhibits “a significant degree of carelessness.”163
Prime examples include writing a PIN on a note that is kept besides the
payment instrument, leaving the payment instrument in an easily accessible
place, or typing in a password knowing that a person is watching.164 The
155. Id. at 139.
156. Id. (“[The PISP must show] that the payment order was received by the

customer’s ASPSP and, within the PISP’s sphere of influence, the payment transaction
was authenticated, accurately recorded[,] and not affected by a technical breakdown or
other deficiency.”).
157. Open Banking, Open Liability, supra note 153 (noting that the “sphere of
influence” may still lead to disputes).
158. PSD II, supra note 1, art. 74(1) at 96–97; PSR, supra note 141, art. 77, ¶¶ 1–2.
Note that under the PSD II, this limit is €50. However, the customer will not be liable
for any amount where the loss was not detectable, or where the loss was caused by an
employee, agent, or branch of a PSP, or its outsourced provider.
159. These obligations are imposed under PSD II Articles 69 and 74. PSD II, supra
note 1, art. 69, 74 at 94, 96–97; PSR, supra note 141, art. 72.
160. According to the FCA, “‘payment instrument’ has a wide
definition . . . includ[ing] payment cards, e-banking[,] and telephone banking
arrangements.” FCA APPROACH DOCUMENT, supra note 154, at 98.
161. PSD II, supra note 1, art. 74(1) at 96–97; PSR, supra note 141, art. 77, ¶ 3.
162. “Detectable” is not defined in PSD II Article 4 (“Definitions”), nor in Article 74
(“Payer’s liability for unauthorised payment transactions”). See also Zhang, supra note
151 (identifying PSR provisions where the meanings of certain threshold words are
ambiguous).
163. PSD II, supra note 1, recital 72 at 47.
164. Id.; Steennot, supra note 130, at 961.
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FCA clarified that “it is not sufficient . . . to assert that the customer ‘must
have’ divulged” security credentials165 — further underscoring that evidence
must be provided to prove fraud or gross negligence, with the burden of proof
once again on the bank.166
It comes as no surprise that allocation of liability has been one of the most
controversial issues under the PSD II regime.167 Banks are the first port of
call for refunds even where there is a direct interaction between a customer
and TPP, with banks citing this liability model to be a “key challenge” of
third-party access.168
The Institute of International Finance has
recommended that responsibility should instead lie first on the party (the
bank or TPP) from which the transaction originated.169
In brief, notwithstanding some ambiguities around the liability allocation
arrangements, the current regime under the PSD II/PSR 2017 has been
working towards being more payer (customer)-friendly than its
predecessor.170 Customers can, for instance, have the same protection if they
use a PISP to initiate the transactions.171 Customers’ liability for losses not
arising from grossly negligent or intentional breach of their obligations has
been reduced from £50 to £35.172 Furthermore, supporting evidence is
required to prove a customer’s fraud or gross negligence, and gross
negligence has been clarified to require more than a mere breach of the duty
of care.173 Some commentators thus point out that under the new regime, “if
one actually keeps his personalized security credentials safe, risks [for the
customer] become very limited.”174

165. FCA APPROACH DOCUMENT, supra note 154, at 123–24.
166. PSD II, supra note 1, art. 72(2) at 96; PSR, supra note 141, art. 75, ¶ 4.
167. See Open Banking, Open Liability, supra note 153 (emphasizing that the

European Payments Council expressed discontent with banks being held liable when they
already take on financial risks and burdens).
168. See DELOITTE, EUROPEAN PSD2 SURVEY: VOICE OF THE BANKS 10 (2018),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/cz/Documents/financial-services/Delo
itte_European_PSD2_Voice_of_the_Banks_Survey_012018.pdf
(listing
primary
challenges that banks identified with the PSD II).
169. INST. OF INT’L FIN., supra note 129, at 6.
170. See Steennot, supra note 130, at 963 (listing ways in which the PSD II regime
increases customer protections).
171. PSD II, supra note 1, art. 73(2) at 96; PSR, supra note 141, art. 76, ¶ 5; Steennot,
supra note 129, at 963.
172. Payment Services Regulations 2009, SI 2009/209, art. 62, ¶ 1, which set a
maximum of £50 for such payer’s liability, has been replaced by PSR 2017, art. 77, ¶ 1,
which sets a maximum of £35.
173. PSD II, supra note 1, art. 72(2) at 96; PSR, supra note 141, art. 75, ¶ 4; Steennot,
supra note 129, at 963–64.
174. Steennot, supra note 129, at 964.
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Allocating liabilities raises two inter-related questions. One, what can be
done about the fact that unauthorized transactions could go hand in hand with
the lack of security measures? Two, what, if any, mechanism is put in place
to address disputes arising from the Open Banking context? On the former,
the EU/UK framework requires “strong customer authentication” and places
rather strict liability on banks — no liability can be imposed on customers in
the absence of such mechanisms.175 As for the latter, the UK’s Open
Banking Standard has gone beyond PSD II to establish a Dispute
Management System (“DMS”).176 Although it does not offer a liability or
dispute resolution model in itself, it creates common best practice principles
for banks and TPPs.177
ii. Australian Model
As in the UK, an accredited data recipient must have adequate insurance
(or comparable guarantee) to compensate consumers for losses arising from
contravention of duties under the CDR regime.178 They may, subject to the
services they offer and potential liability exposure, require professional
indemnity insurance, cyber insurance, or both.179
A CDR participant is protected from liability under Section 56GC of the
CDR Act where they provide CDR data as per the regulations and Consumer
Data Rules. Unlike the PSD II/PSR 2017, however, the CDR does not
contain a liability framework itself. Thus, the “ePayments Code” — to
which most banks subscribe — would appear the most relevant instrument
that comes into play concerning liabilities associated with unauthorized
transactions. There are issues around the use of the ePayments Code in this
context. First, the ePayments Code is voluntary and does not apply to TPPs
unless they subscribe to it.180 Second, while the ePayments Code has one
chapter dedicated to allocating liability arising from unauthorized
175. PSD II, supra note 1, art. 74(2) at 97; PSR, supra note 141, art. 77, ¶ 4(c); see
infra Section III.D.
176. See Dispute Management System, OBIE, https://www.openbanking.org.uk/prov
iders/dispute-management-system/ (last visited July 13, 2021).
177. INST. OF INT’L FIN., supra note 129, at 5 (“The DMS is a voluntary mechanism
under which participants adhere to a code of best practices, including on how to handle
cases at the first instance, and how those can be taken to mediation, adjudication or
arbitration.”).
178. Consumer Data Rules, supra note 88, r 5.12(2)(b).
179. AUSTL. COMPETITION & CONSUMER CMM’N, DRAFT, CONSUMER DATA RIGHT
SUPPLEMENTARY ACCREDITATION GUIDELINES: INSURANCE 5 (Sep. 23, 2019), https://
www.accc.gov.au/system/files/CDR%20draft%20supplementary%20accreditation%20
guidelines%20-%20insurance.pdf.
180. AUSTL. SEC. & INV. COMM’N, EPAYMENTS CODE 2 (2016), https://download.
asic.gov.au/media/3798542/epayments-code-published-29-march-2016.pdf.
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transactions, its focus is on the relationship between subscribing banks and
customers.181 More specifically, the ePayments Code provides a set of rules
under which a customer (i.e., account-holder) will only be liable for losses
in specified circumstances: for instance, where the customer contributed to
the loss by “unreasonably delaying reporting the misuse, loss, or theft of a
device” or breach of passcodes,182 or where the bank can prove “on the
balance of probabilities that [the customer] contributed to a loss through
fraud or breaching the passcode security requirements.”183 Notably, a breach
of the passcode security requirement could cover acts like voluntary
disclosure of a customer’s login credentials to a third party, or recording
passcodes on anything carried with the device, or otherwise “act[ing] with
extreme carelessness in failing to protect the security” of passcodes.184 In
such cases, the customer may be liable for any losses arising from associated
unauthorized transactions.185 Therefore, the ePayments Code may struggle
to accommodate screen scraping practices as customers are likely to breach
the security requirement if they share data with TPPs.186 The legality of
screen scraping technologies with the ePayment Code has become a source
of debate, which will be considered later.187 In summary, unlike its EU/UK
counterpart, the CDR has not yet articulated a full-fledged regime allocating
the liabilities between different parties in the contemporary Open Banking
ecosystem.
D. How to Address Security and Privacy Concerns?
Although the risks associated with data sharing are not entirely novel, the
greater access to data does increase the potential points of cyber-attacks and
181. See generally id. (noting that the Code regulates electronic payment services and
“banks, credit unions, building societies and other providers of electronic payment
facilities to consumers subscribe”).
182. Id. s 11.5.
183. Id. s 11.2.
184. Id. s 12.
185. Id. s 11.
186. See THE TREASURY (AUSTL.), REVIEW INTO OPEN BANKING, supra note 15, at 51
(recognizing that the ASIC has not formed a definitive view on screen scraping, though
quoting the ASIC’s belief that “such actions could be viewed as the consumer breaching
the standard banking terms and conditions for non-disclosure of passwords . . . in the
ePayments Code”); see also ASIC & ACCC: Screen Scraping is a Valid Method of Data
Sharing, AUSTL. FINTECH (Mar. 9, 2020), https://australianfintech.com.au/asic-acccscreen-scraping-is-a-valid-method-of-data-sharing-2/; James Eyers, ASIC, ACCC Give
Green Light to ‘Screen Scraping’, FIN. REV. (Feb. 28, 2020), https://www.afr.com/
companies/financial-services/asic-accc-give-green-light-to-screen-scraping-20200228p54588.
187. See infra Part III.E.
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data breaches.188 How to manage these concerns has become a daunting task
for policymakers in both the UK and Australia, as discussed below.
i. EU/UK Model
The PSD II states that it “guarantees a high level of consumer protection,
security of payment transactions, and protection against fraud.”189 It also
stresses that the national authorities should “have in place adequate and
effective safeguards” to respect fundamental rights, including privacy.190 To
this end, it sets out various mechanisms — from rigorous authentication
methods to mandatory risk management and reporting systems. However, it
has been debated whether these measures are resilient enough in managing
security and data protection concerns.191
Regarding security concerns, the EU/UK regime allows banks to deny
TPPs access to a payment account for “objectively justified and duly
evidenced reasons relating to unauthori[z]ed or fraudulent access to the
payment account.”192 In such cases, the bank shall inform the customer
“before access is denied and at the latest immediately thereafter.”193 Also,
banks must report such incidents to the relevant authority (in the UK, the
FCA).194
More generally, all PSPs under the PSD II/PSR 2017 are required to have
a framework with appropriate measures and control mechanisms to manage
operational and security risks.195 Such a framework should be “proportionate
to its size and the nature, scope, complexity and riskiness of its operating
188. Pieter T.J. Wolters & Bart P.F. Jacobs, The Security of Access to Accounts Under
the PSD2, 35 COMP. L. & SEC. REV. 29, 30 (2019) (arguing that customers within an open
banking system are vulnerable at more points to their information being abused for
“identity theft, blackmail, [or] illegal pricing discrimination”).
189. Id. at 30; see PSD II, supra note 1, recitals 5–7, 33, 42, 66–67, 69, 75, 77, 84–
85, 95, 109 at 36, 40, 42, 46–49, 51, 53.
190. PSD II, supra note 1, recital 46 at 42.
191. See, e.g., Wolters & Jacobs, supra note 188, at 40–41 (arguing that these
measures, like robust authentication, are inadequate and are subordinate to the goal of
market development).
192. PSD II, supra note 1, art. 68(5) at 94; PSR, supra note 141, art. 71, ¶ 7.
193. PSD II, supra note 1, art. 68(5) at 94; PSR, supra note 141, art. 71, ¶ 8(a)–(b).
194. PSD II, supra note 1, art. 68(6) at 94; PSR, supra note 141, art. 71, ¶ 8(c).
195. These obligations apply to not only banks but to AISPs and PISPs, which must
become an authorized provider to access data under PSD II. Such authorization will only
be granted if the relevant national authority is satisfied that the company is suitable to
provide AIS or PIS based on their internal control mechanisms (i.e., systems
safeguarding the business from fraud and error), risk management procedures (e.g., risk
identification, monitoring, and customer authentication), and incident response (e.g.,
monitoring and reporting policies), among others. PSD II, supra note 1, arts. 5, 95–96 at
59–63, 104–05; PSR, supra note 141, arts. 5, 98–99, sch. 2.
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model, and of the payment services it offers.”196 A PSP is required to notify
the FCA without undue delay in the event of a noteworthy operational or
security breach.197 Another notable design is the introduction of the “strong
customer authentication” (“SCA”) requirement. Where customers wish to
use services offered by a TPP, SCA requirements would generally apply.198
SCA involves a customer’s demonstration of at least two of three types of
identity verification: knowledge (e.g., a password), possession (e.g.,
possessing a particular mobile device by accepting a push notification),
and/or inherence (e.g., fingerprint or iris recognition).199 While SCA must
be used in all other cases,200 there are certain exemptions based on payment
avenue, frequency, degree of risk, and amount of the transaction201 — a
provider can, for instance, choose not to apply SCA in transactions involving
low amount, 202 low risk, 203 or “trusted beneficiaries” nominated by the
customer. 204 These exemptions attempt to balance security and payment
interests.205 Notably, a bank forgoing SCA under an exemption will alter the
allocation of liability (to its detriment) in regard to losses from unauthorized
transactions. While a customer would usually be liable if they acted with
“gross negligence” in failing to keep payment instruments or credentials
safe,206 in circumstances where SCA is not used by the bank, the customer
will instead only bear losses where they have acted fraudulently.207 Overall,
the SCA method increases the certainty that the legitimate customer wishes
to make a payment or access their account, rather than someone attempting
to commit fraud.208
All firms that wish to participate in the Open Banking regime must be
subject to common standards for communication, authentication, data

196. FCA APPROACH DOCUMENT, supra note 154, at 242.
197. PSD II, supra note 1, art. 96(1) at 105; PSR, supra note 141, art. 99, ¶ 1.
198. PSD II, supra note 1, art. 97 at 106; PSR, supra note 141, art. 100. It is the TPP

that is obliged to apply the SCA, while the bank must simply allow the TPP to rely on
the authentication procedures provided to the customer.
199. PSD II, supra note 1, art. 4(30) at 59.
200. Id. art. 97 at 106; PSR, supra note 141, art. 100.
201. PSD II, supra note 1, art. 98(3) at 107; FCA APPROACH DOCUMENT, supra note
154, at 256. The exemptions are transposed into UK law by PSR art. 100, ¶ 5.
202. RTS, supra note 98, art. 16 at 32.
203. Id. art. 18 at 33.
204. Such exemptions are specified in the RTS. Id. arts. 10–18 at 31–33.
205. Zunzunegui, supra note 59, at 29–30.
206. PSD II, supra note 1, art. 74(1) at 96.
207. Id. art. 74(2) at 97.
208. See RTS, supra note 98, art. 2 at 28–30.
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storage, and security.209 Many of these requirements are set forth under the
Regulatory Technical Standards for Strong Customer Authentication and
Common and Secure Open Standards of Communication (“RTS”). The RTS
took effect in 2019 after being released by the European Banking Authority
(“EBA”) in cooperation with the European Central Bank (“ECB”) and was
then approved as a Commission delegated regulation.210
The RTS elaborates on managing operational and security risks under the
PSD II, which has been adopted in the UK.211 For instance, both banks and
TPPs are required by PSD II/PSR 2017 to ensure that they communicate with
each other “in a secure way” and per the specific standards set out by the
RTS.212 To this end, the RTS fleshes out detailed requirements for secure
communication like the use of “strong and widely” recognized encryption
techniques,213 keeping sessions as short as possible, 214 limiting staff access
to confidential information,215 and various obligations for interfaces.216 It
also requires “transaction monitoring mechanisms” to be in place to detect
unauthorized or fraudulent transactions.217
These RTS requirements are elaborated upon in the UK’s data standards,
released by the OBIE.218 This is an independent, private entity funded and
organized mainly by the CMA9 banks,219 although some public oversight
mechanisms are in place.220 The decision-making body of OBIE consists of
209. See generally THE OPEN BANKING STANDARD, OPEN DATA INSTITUTE (Louise
Bolotin ed. 2020), http://theodi.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/298569302-The-OpenBanking-Standard-1.pdf (explaining that with Open Banking, financial institutions must
adopt uniform standards across the industry).
210. RTS, supra note 98, art. 38(2) at 42.
211. For example, the security measures referred to in regulations 68, 69, 70, 77, and
100 of the PSR are adopted from the RTS. FCA APPROACH DOCUMENT, supra note 154,
at 211.
212. PSD II, supra note 1, arts. 66(3)(d), 67(2)(c) at 92–93.
213. RTS, supra note 98, art. 35(1) at 41.
214. Id. art. 35(2) at 41.
215. Id. art. 35(5) at 41.
216. Id. arts. 30–33 at 37–40.
217. Id. art. 2(1) at 27–28.
218. Read-Write Data API Specifications, OBIE, https://openbanking.atlassian.net/
wiki/spaces/DZ/pages/1077805207/Read+Write+Data+API+Specification+-+v3.1.2
(last updated Aug. 20, 2019).
219. COMPETITION & MKTS. AUTH., RETAIL BANKING MARKET INVESTIGATION 441
(2016) (ordering the UK’s nine largest banks to set up an Implementation Entity “tasked
with agreeing, implementing, and maintaining open and common banking standards”).
220. The chair is accountable to the CMA and must provide monthly reports to them.
The steering group includes observers from four public bodies (the HM’s Treasury, the
FCA, the Payment Systems Regulator, and the Information Commissioner’s Office). See
id. at 39; UK CMA Order, supra note 65, sch. 1 item 2.

2021

SHIFTING CONTOUR OF DATA SHARING

315

CMA9 representatives, customer representatives, and representatives from
various stakeholder groups (e.g., Fintechs).221 These parties collectively
shape the data standards released by OBIE, imposing various requirements
(such as API, data format, and security standards) that ensure the practical
and secure functioning of Open Banking.222 Besides security measures, the
EU/UK regime is also concerned with a potential data breach by stating at
the outset that “data protection by design and data protection by default
should be embedded in all data processing systems”223 and that personal data
should be provided and processed “in accordance with Directive 95/46” —
the predecessor of the GDPR.224 As for the interaction between the GDPR
and the PSD II, several points are noteworthy. First, it is generally agreed
that the PSD II is not “lex specialis” vis-à-vis the GDPR, but rather provides
a specific framework on how payment data should be accessed.225 The
European Data Protection Board (“EDPB”), for instance, in its response to
the Dutch Data Protection Authority, implied as much about Article 94 of
the PSD II by stating that, “the interpretation and the implementation of the
articles in PSD2 have to be made in light of the GDPR.”226 BEUC — the
European Consumer Organisation — made this point even clearer:
[A]ccess to bank account information can very often reveal sensitive data
which would fall under Article 9 GDPR. Explicit consent under the GDPR
should be required as the legal basis for processing in those situations
where special categories of data would be involved. Otherwise, banks and
221. UK CMA Order, supra note 65, sch. 1 Part A. Specifically, stakeholder views
are presented by the conveners of advisory groups (representing Fintechs, challenger
banks, PSPs, and others).
222. Id. § 10.1 (detailing providers’ requirements to implement and maintain
“without charge” open API and data sharing standards).
223. PSD II, supra note 1, recital 89 at 50.
224. Id. art. 94(1) at 104. Article 94 of the GDPR states that references to the repealed
Directive shall be read as references to GDPR.
225. See, e.g., EUR. BANKING FED’N, GUIDANCE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
REVISED PAYMENT SERVICES DIRECTIVE 83 (2019) [hereinafter EBF, PSD2 GUIDANCE],
https://www.ebf.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/EBF-PSD2-Guidance-Final-v.120.pdf;
FCA APPROACH DOCUMENT, supra note 154, at 220 (“A PSP must ensure that it meets
its obligations under both the PSRs 2017 and data protection law cumulatively.”); cf.
Giangiacomo Olivi, PSD2: Legal Issues in Open Banking (and GDPR!), DENTONS (Feb.
26, 2019), https://www.dentons.com/en/insights/articles/2019/february/26/psd2-legalissues-in-open-banking-and-gdpr (explaining that PSD II “could be lex specialis with
respect to GDPR” because the PSD II passed in 2015, before the GDPR was enacted).
226. Letter from Andrea Jelinek, Chairperson, Eur. Data Prot. Bd., to Sophie in ‘t
Veld, Member, Eur. Parliament 2 (July 5, 2018) [hereinafter EDPB 2018 Letter],
https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/files/files/file1/psd2_letter_en.pdf (explaining that
GDPR data protections must be consistently applied throughout the EU because, under
Article 94, “references to the repealed Directive 95/46 shall be construed as references
to the GDPR”).
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TPPs would be actively circumventing the GDPR. In this sense, PSD II is
not lex specialis.227

Two related issues arise from the above observation. For one, each Open
Banking participant should be considered as a separate data controller and
should be responsible for its own data processing. While banks are obliged
to ensure data access by TPPs via dedicated interfaces, such third parties are
not selected by banks; thus, banks do not have the duty to ascertain a TPP’s
GDPR compliance.228
For another, the term “consent” should be read differently under the PSD
II and the GDPR — they have different functions with different
requirements. Specifically, data sharing under Article 94(2) of the PSD II
and Regulation 97 of the PSR 2017 is conditioned upon a customer’s
“explicit consent,” which is an “additional requirement of a contractual
nature” and is “not the same as (explicit) consent under the GDPR.”229 The
consent in the Open Banking regime should be understood therefore in
conjunction with GDPR Article 6(1)(b) given that processing data is
necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is a
party. Accordingly, “when entering a contract with a payment service
provider under PSD2, data subjects must be made fully aware of the purposes
for which their personal data will be processed and have to explicitly agree[]
to these clauses.”230 For purposes other than those necessary for performing
a contract, one can rely on “consent” under GDPR Article 6(1)(a), provided
that other conditions are met.231 In short, PSD II increases the standard of
data protection by imposing additional consent.
Another sticking issue around consent arises when a consumer allows a
TPP access to their data, such data would often involve the transactions

227. EUR. CONSUMER ORG. (BEUC), BUEC’S RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE EDPB ON
THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE GDPR AND PSD2, 3–4 (2019), https://www.beuc.eu/

publications/beuc-x-2019-021_beuc_recommendations_to_edpb-interplay_gdpr-psd2.
pdf.
228. See EBF, PSD2 GUIDANCE, supra note 225, at 84.
229. EDPB 2018 Letter, supra note 226, at 4 (“Such clauses should be clearly
distinguishable from the other matters dealt with in the contract and would need to be
explicitly accepted by the data subject.”).
230. Id.
231. Specifically, those conditions set forth under Articles 4(11) and 7 of the GDPR.
Some practitioners suggest that, from a practical perspective, PSPs will have to “build
an explicit consent mechanism aligned with the PSD2, but not with the GDPR. As far
as GDPR is concerned, they will have to rely on another lawful basis (namely,
contractual necessity) to process data from a GDPR perspective.” Scott McInnes et al.,
EU: The Interplay of PSD2 and GDPR — Some Select Issues, BIRD & BIRD (Feb. 2019),
https://www.twobirds.com/en/news/articles/2019/global/eu-the-interplay-of-psd2-andgdpr-some-select-issues.
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between that customer with a third party — the so-called “silent party.”232
Would processing a silent party’s data put TPPs inconsistent with the GDPR
absent the consent of that such party? In this regard, the EDPB stated that in
the case of TPPs, the “legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a
third party” under GDPR Article 6(1)(f) should provide a lawful basis for
processing a silent party’s personal data.233 Yet, the EDPB noted that this
legitimate interest must not be “overridden by the interests or fundamental
rights and freedoms of the data subject,” and such processing must be
unavoidable, comparable, and align with other GDPR principles like
“purpose limitation, data minimi[z]ation and transparency.”234
Speaking of data minimization, the PSD II regime does mirror what is
required under GDPR Article 5(1)(c). For instance, in the context of AISP
PSD II only allows entities to request and access the information that is
necessary to initiate the payment transaction.235 Relatedly, the PSD II
excludes “sensitive payment data” (e.g., personalized security credentials)
from the scope of the access to accounts.236
Notwithstanding these security and data protection measures, there are
still concerns. In terms of security measures, notably, there are criticisms
against the “fall-back” option allowing the use of screen scraping.237 It is
also argued that the PSPs have considerable discretion to organize the
authentication process, which can undermine the goal to make the process as
secure as possible.238 It is likewise suggested that the data minimization
principle could be easily compromised by TPPs by offering a wide range of
services.239 However, these pitfalls do not necessarily mean that customers
lack adequate protection as a matter of practice: it remains to be seen how

232. For instance, a customer named John transferred money to his friend Jane to
share dining costs. If John decides to use an AISP’s services by allowing the bank to
share data, Jane’s information would be included as part of that information. See EDPB
2018 Letter, supra note 226, at 2.
233. See id. at 3.
234. Id.
235. See, e.g., PSD II, supra note 1, arts. 66(3)(f), 66(3)(g), 67(2)(d) at 92–93; PSR,
supra note 141, art. 69, ¶ 3(f), art. 70, ¶ 3(d).
236. PSD II, supra note 1, arts. 4(32), 67(2)(e), at 59, 93; PSR, supra note 141, art. 2,
¶ 1, art. 70, ¶ 3(e).
237. See infra Part III.E.
238. Wolters & Jacobs, supra note 188, at 29 (noting that “banks do not seem required
to trust this process” and banks do not need to be able “to verify the authentication or the
integrity of the payment order”).
239. Id. at 32 (stating that the required information “depends on the offered service;”
therefore, if a broad range of services are offered, the limitation can be avoided).
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the security and data protection requirements will be tested in the next few
years.240
ii. Australia Model
According to the Australian Information Commissioner, “securing CDR
data is an integral element of the CDR regime.”241 Like in its EU/UK
counterpart, authorization is an effective tool: data relating to identifiable
consumers can generally only be transferred to Accredited Data Recipients
(“ADR”) (or the consumer themselves).242 To become accredited,243 a TPP
must demonstrate sufficient security measures,244 as evaluated through the
“information security obligation” (discussed below).245 Such requirements
are an ongoing duty — where a TPP fails to maintain them after
accreditation; the ACCC can revoke, suspend or impose conditions upon
their status as an ADR.246
While the legislation itself features some of these protection principles,247
the CDR framework also contains the flexibility to react to emerging privacy
and security risks.248 This is achieved by way of rule-making (e.g., the CDR
240. Also note the penalties available for enforcement under the PSR: the FCA may
impose a financial penalty corresponding to those under the Financial Services and
Markets Act 2000 (PSR arts. 111, 112, ¶ 6), cancel a PSP’s authorization (art. 10),
publish a statement of public censure (art. 110) or seek an injunction (art. 113). PSR,
supra note 141, arts. 10, 111, 112, ¶ 6, 113.
241. OFF. OF THE AUSTL. INFO. COMM’R, CDR PRIVACY SAFEGUARD GUIDELINES,
CHAPTER 12: PRIVACY SAFEGUARD 12 – SECURITY OF CDR DATA, AND DESTRUCTION OR
DE-IDENTIFICATION OF REDUNDANT DATA 3 (2020) (stating that securing this data is
important to ensure that it is not misused, lost, accessed without authorization, or
modified).
242. Competition and Consumer Act, supra note 91, s 56BD(1)(b). While transfers
of data out of the CDR system are possible, it is highly restricted. THE TREASURY
(AUSTL.), CONSUMER DATA RIGHT PRIVACY PROTECTIONS 5 (2018) [hereinafter THE
TREASURY (AUSTL.), CDR PRIVACY PROTECTIONS], https://treasury.gov.au/sites/
default/files/2019-03/CDR-Privacy-Summary.pdf.
243. Accreditation criteria are set by the ACCC pursuant to section 56BH(1) of the
Competition and Consumer Act. See also Consumer Data Rules, supra note 88, pt 5.
244. THE TREASURY (AUSTL.), CDR PRIVACY PROTECTIONS, supra note 242, at 5;
Explanatory Memorandum, CDR Bill, supra note 71, at 20.
245. ACCC, CDR SUPPLEMENTARY GUIDELINES: INFORMATION SECURITY, supra note
92, at 5.
246. THE TREASURY (AUSTL.), CDR PRIVACY PROTECTIONS, supra note 242, at 5
(explaining the ACCC’s oversight power); OFF. OF THE AUSTL. INFO. COMM’R, CDR
PRIVACY SAFEGUARD GUIDELINES, supra note 241 (stating that, if the applicant does not
remain compliant with Privacy Safeguard 12, its accreditation may be revoked).
247. While Safeguards 1 to 11 largely aim to address privacy concerns, Safeguard 12
also addresses security concerns. Competition and Consumer Act, supra note 91, s 56
EO(1).
248. THE TREASURY (AUSTL.), CDR PRIVACY PROTECTIONS, supra note 242, at 4
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Rules) and standard-setting processes (e.g., the “Data Standards”).249 The
Rules are made by the ACCC to flesh out the substantial requirements of the
scheme,250 while the Data Standards help to ensure functionality and security
at a practical level.251 In contrast to the UK’s private, industry-funded OBIE,
these are developed by a government-appointed Data Standards Chair252 with
assistance from a public Data Standards Body253 (currently the CSIRO’s
“Data 61” team).254 Nonetheless, there is still room for industry input in
developing the Standards, with the Chair using his powers to establish a
Banking Advisory Committee.255
The CDR regime’s “information security obligation” imposes
requirements that resemble those of its EU/UK counterpart. It requires an
ADR to take appropriate measures to protect CDR data “from misuse,
interference and loss, and from unauthori[z]ed access, modification and
disclosure,” with minimum steps outlined in the CDR Rules.256 Like in the
EU/UK regime,257 these minimum requirements mean that an ADR must —
at least annually — identify potential security risks and detail the mitigation
measures they have implemented in response.258 Similar to various other
PSD II requirements,259 an accredited person must also establish processes
(explaining the flexibilities in the framework to respond to risks).
249. Id. The Consumer Data Rules are made by the ACCC. See Competition and
Consumer Act, supra note 91, s 56BA. The Data Standards are made by the Data
Standards Chair. See id. s 56FA.
250. For example, the Rules prescribe requirements for collection, disclosure, and use
of CDR data. See id. s 57BB.
251. For example, the Standards may prescribe the processes and format for data
transfer (among other things). See id. s 56FA(1); Explanatory Memorandum, CDR Bill,
supra note 71, at 7, 48.
252. Competition and Consumer Act, supra note 91, s 56FA(1).
253. Id. s 56FK(1).
254. See Consumer Data Standards, CSIRO, DATA61, https://data61.csiro.au/en/OurResearch/Focus-Areas/Special-Projects/Consumer-Data-Standards (last updated Jul. 3,
2020).
255. This Committee includes banks, consumer, and Fintech representatives. See
Competition and Consumer Act, supra note 91, s 56FH(2)(a); THE TREASURY (AUSTL.),
PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT: CONSUMER DATA RIGHT 52 (2019) [hereinafter THE
TREASURY (AUSTL.), PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT]; Banking Advisory Committee,
CONSUMER DATA STANDARDS, https://consumerdatastandards.org.au/about/advisorycommittee/ (last visited July 16, 2021).
256. Consumer Data Rules, supra note 88, r 5.12, sch 2 item 1.3; ACCC, CDR
SUPPLEMENTARY GUIDELINES: INFORMATION SECURITY, supra note 92; see also
Consumer Data Rules, supra note 88, sch 2 for the minimum requirements.
257. PSD II, supra note 1, art. 95(2) at 104. Under PSD II, the PSP must also provide
this assessment to their competent authority.
258. Consumer Data Rules, supra note 88, sch 2 item 1.3.
259. The EU/UK regime requires “strong customer authentication,” “strong and
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to limit unauthorized access (including multi-factor authentication for all
access to CDR data other than by the data’s CDR consumer), secure their
network and systems (including by use of encryption), and implement a
formal program to identify and remediate vulnerabilities quickly.260 Such
security capabilities must be reviewed and adjusted at least annually, or more
frequently where there has been a “material change” in the nature and extent
of threats.261 Lastly, and again analogously to its EU/UK counterpart,262 the
Rules require incident management and reporting in the form of “CDR data
security response plans.”263 Such procedures must detect and respond to
information security incidents “as soon as practicable.”264 They must also
involve the notification of “eligible data breaches”265 to the Information
Commissioner and to affected consumers where required266 and
“information security incidents” to the Australian Cyber Security Centre.267
The most salient feature in the CDR regime is perhaps the thirteen Privacy
Safeguards (“PSs”) introduced by the CDR Act.268 While the PSD II/PSR
regime contains several provisions on data protection, the CDR Act goes one
step further by creating its own privacy protection mechanism. These legally
binding statutory provisions are inserted into the Competition and Consumer
Act 2010 itself,269 setting out rights and obligations in relation to collecting,

widely recogni[z]ed” encryption techniques, and internal control mechanisms to detect
and classify security incidents. See PSD II, supra note 1, arts. 95(1), 97 at 104, 106;
RTS, supra note 98, art. 35(1) at 41.
260. Consumer Data Rules, supra note 88, sch 2 item 2.2.
261. Id. item 1.5(2).
262. The EU/UK regime requires PSPs to maintain effective incident management
procedures and report major incidents to the competent authority. See PSD II, supra note
1, arts. 95(1), 96(1) at 104–05.
263. Consumer Data Rules, supra note 88, sch 2 item 1.7(2).
264. Id. item 1.7(1).
265. An “eligible data breach” is a data breach “likely to result in serious harm to any
of the individuals to whom the information relates.” Privacy Act 1988, supra note 112,
s 26WE.
266. Consumer Data Rules, supra note 88, sch 2 item 1.7(3)(b); see also Privacy Act
1988, supra note 112, pt IIIC.
267. “In any case, this notification must occur no later than 30 days after the ADR
becomes aware of the security incident.” Consumer Data Rules, supra note 88, sch 2
item 1.7(3)(c).
268. OFF. OF THE AUSTL. INFO, COMM’R, CDR PRIVACY SAFEGUARD GUIDELINES,
supra note 241, at CHAPTER A: INTRODUCTORY MATTERS 4 (listing the thirteen Privacy
Safeguards).
269. See Competition and Consumer Act, supra note 91, div 5; OFF. OF THE AUSTL.
INFO, COMM’R, CDR PRIVACY SAFEGUARD GUIDELINES, supra note 241, at CHAPTER A:
INTRODUCTORY MATTERS 4.
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holding, using, and disclosing CDR data.270 They are more onerous than the
long-established APPs under the Privacy Act 1988.271 Several broader points
can be drawn here. First, the interplay between the PSs and the
APPs/Privacy Act can be even more complicated than its EU/UK
counterpart. In some instances, the PSs operate alongside the APPs, while
in others, the PSs operate to exclude the APPs.272 Specifically, the
application of PSs depends on the context — for instance, while they
primarily apply to ADRs, they are also applicable to data holders concerning
their handling of the CDR data.273 Moreover, the obligations imposed could
vary depending on the CDR entity. For instance, while APP 1 sets forth
overall privacy management for all APP entities,274 PSs have different
requirements for a CDR data holder (i.e., banks) and an ADR (i.e., TPPs).275
This is to ensure that “there are no gaps” in data protection under the CDR
regime.276
Second, the CDR regime features various GDPR-style protections. The
PSs, for instance, cast a wider net by applying to CDR data that relates to
individuals or entities,277 while the APPs apply to “personal information”
that is about an identified or “reasonably identifiable” individual.278 The
270. OFF. OF THE AUSTL. INFO, COMM’R, CDR PRIVACY SAFEGUARD GUIDELINES,
supra note 241, at CHAPTER A: INTRODUCTORY MATTERS at 4. Note that the Safeguards
“only apply to data for which there are one or more consumers” (consumer data) rather
than product data. Competition and Consumer Act, supra note 91, s 56EB(1).
271. Compare Privacy Act 1988, supra note 112 (setting out what constitutes an APP
breach but not identifying the safeguards in place), with Competition and Consumer Act,
supra note 91, div 5 (stating both of the privacy safeguards that are in position to protect
CDR consumers and their data).
272. Explanatory Memorandum, CDR Bill, supra note 71, at 54–66 (stating that the
privacy safeguards are in place to operate with the APPs; however, noncompliance may
result in the privacy safeguards excluding the APPs).
273. Almost all PSs (barring 3 and 4) apply to ADRs, while only PSs 1, 10, 11, and
13 apply to data holders (when handling CDR data). OFF. OF THE AUSTL. INFO, COMM’R,
CDR PRIVACY SAFEGUARD GUIDELINES, supra note 241, at CHAPTER A: INTRODUCTORY
MATTERS 6.
274. An “APP entity” is defined in section 6 of the Privacy Act as “a [Commonwealth]
agency or organi[z]ation.” In this context, “organi[z]ation” excludes businesses that had
a turnover of less than $3,000,000 AUD in the last financial year (“small businesses”).
Privacy Act 1988, supra note 112, ss 6C, 6D.
275. Competition and Consumer Act, supra note 91, s 56ED(4)–(5).
276. OFF. OF THE AUSTL. INFO, COMM’R, CDR PRIVACY SAFEGUARD GUIDELINES,
supra note 241, at CHAPTER A: INTRODUCTORY MATTERS 7. Competition and Consumer
Act, supra note 91, s 56EC indicates several scenarios where the APP do not apply in the
CDR context.
277. Competition and Consumer Act, supra note 91, ss 56AI(3), 56EB(1);
Explanatory Memorandum, CDR Bill, supra note 71, at 7.
278. Privacy Act 1988, supra note 112, s 6, sch 1. It is arguable whether social media
platforms’ collection of location data, or fitness trackers’ collection of heart rate and
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GDPR applies to “data controllers” and “data processors,”279 while PSs
likewise apply to data holders and recipients — which, like its EU/UK
counterpart, includes “small business[es].”280 More crucially, the PSs
enhance privacy protection in various aspects. 281 For instance, both the
GDPR and PSs require “express consent,”282 while implied consent is also
allowed under the APPs.283 However, the CDR is more restrictive than the
GDPR — it does not permit the non-consent-based collection, use, or
transfer on grounds like “legitimate interests” of the businesses.284
Furthermore, like the GDPR,285 the CDR regime gives any persons affected
(including individuals) the standing to sue for CDR breaches — including
privacy breaches.286 Also, similar to the GDPR,287 contravention of most
PSs may attract severe civil penalties.288 Relating to this is that the CDR

sleep pattern data, would fall within the scope of personal information. MEESE ET AL.,
supra note 115, at 7. This contrasts to the GDPR and CDR — specifically, “personal
data” as defined under article 4(1) of the GDPR, or CDR data as defined under section
56AI Competition and Consumer Act — which both clearly cover indirect data. See id.
at 7, 9.
279. GDPR, supra note 108, arts. 2–3 at 32–33.
280. Unlike the APPs which do not apply to “small businesses,” the PSs bind CDR
entities regardless of size. See Competition and Consumer Act, supra note 91, ss 56ED–
56EO; THE TREASURY (AUSTL.), CDR PRIVACY PROTECTIONS, supra note 242, at 4.
281. See THE TREASURY (AUSTL.), PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 255, at
12.
282. Consumer Data Rules 2020 (Cth) rr 4.9, 4.11 (Austl.); GDPR, supra note 108,
arts. 4(11), 6(1)(a), 7 at 34, 36–37.
283. Privacy Act 1988, supra note 112, ss 16A, 16B.
284. Under GDPR article 6(1)(f), processing may be lawful if it is necessary for
“legitimate interests pursued by the controller.”
285. GDPR, supra note 108, art. 82 (“Any person who has suffered material or nonmaterial damage as a result of an infringement of this Regulation shall have the right to
receive compensation from the controller or processor for damages suffered.”).
286. Competition and Consumer Act, supra note 91, s 56EY (“A person who suffers
loss or damage . . . by an act or omission . . . may recover the amount of the loss or
damage by action against that other person or against any person involved in the
contravention.”). There is no such right under the Privacy Act. THE TREASURY (AUSTL.),
PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 255, at 98–99.
287. GDPR article 83(5) breaches can lead to fines of up to €20,000,000 or, “in the
case of an undertaking, up to 4% of the total worldwide annual turnover of the preceding
financial year, whichever is higher.”
288. Competition and Consumer Act, supra note 91, s 56EV. Breaches can lead to
fines up to $500,000 AUD for individuals or $10,000,000 AUD for corporations, or three
times the total value of the benefits that have been obtained, or 10% of the annual
domestic turnover of the entity committing the breach (whichever is greater). This is
vastly increased compared to the Privacy Act’s civil penalty of “2000 penalty units” in
section 13G, which is only for serious or repeated breaches.
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regime has a wider geographical jurisdiction than the Privacy Act/APPs.289
New concerns, however come hand in hand with these improvements. The
most obvious one is the complexity of the multi-tier privacy framework with
personal information regulated by the APPs, a broader set of data governed
by the PSs, and common law playing a role as well.290 The overall result can
be “a series of overlapping and confusing processes and policies,” which can
complicate compliance for consumers and businesses and hence increase
transaction costs.291 One solution is to overhaul the Privacy Act and APPs
entirely rather than introducing a parallel framework.292 Another sticky point
is the “silent party’s data” problem. Like its EU/UK counterpart, the
Australian Treasury has highlighted this concern by stating that “[r]ules may
provide requirements for consent by silent parties, balancing the competing
data rights of the parties, and may provide rules restricting certain uses of
data (e.g., profiling of silent parties).”293 The OAIC Privacy Guidelines
make clear that it is prohibited to use CDR data “for the purpose: of
identifying; compiling insights in relation to; or building a profile in relation
to; any identifiable person who is not a CDR consumer who made the
consumer data request” (including via aggregating the CDR data), unless the
ADR obtains required consent.294

289. The CDR regime applies to “some cases where there would not be an Australian
link for the purposes of the Privacy Act” — for instance, “where data is collected by a
foreign company, outside of Australia, on behalf of an Australian registered company or
an Australian citizen, the CDR would apply, but the Privacy Act would not.” THE
TREASURY (AUSTL.), PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 255, at 158.
290. MEESE ET AL., supra note 115, at 28 (noting that this “complicated legal
framework” will be difficult for businesses to comply with and confusing for
Australians).
291. Id. (advocating that the Australian Government implement a different approach
to alleviate some of these challenges).
292. See, e.g., id. at 28 (recommending options for the Australian Government to
assist businesses while acting efficiently); BUS. COUNCIL OF AUSTL., SUBMISSION NO. 9,
RESPONSE TO THE TREASURY LAWS AMENDMENT (CONSUMER DATA RIGHT) BILL 2018
(SECOND STAGE) 8 (Feb. 28, 2019).
293. THE TREASURY (AUSTL.), PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 255, at
123.
294. OFF. OF THE AUSTL. INFO. COMM’R, CDR PRIVACY SAFEGUARD GUIDELINES,
supra note 241, at CHAPTER 6: PRIVACY SAFEGUARD 6 — USE OR DISCLOSURE OF CDR
DATA BY ACCREDITED DATA RECIPIENTS OR DESIGNATED GATEWAYS 11; Consumer
Data Rules, supra note 88, r 4.12(3)–(4).
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E. Is Screen Scraping Still Legal?
Another controversial issue is the legality of screen scraping after both
jurisdictions formalize data sharing through the Open Banking initiatives,295
as detailed below.
i. EU/UK Model
In the EU/UK, while the PSD II seeks to make screen scraping redundant
as more firms begin to use open APIs, the Directive itself does not prohibit
it.296 Instead, such accessibility is regulated in the RTS, which spells out the
specific requirements for communication channels in Section 2.297 As a
general rule, from the date that the RTS came into effect on September 14,
2019, TPPs’ access to accounts must take one of the authorized forms.298
Banks are required under the RTS to ensure access and prepare an interface
for these third-party providers — either by creating a dedicated API or
modifying their existing interface (enabling TPPs to identify themselves).299
The latter can be seen as screen scraping in a “new, modified form” and has
sometimes been referred to as “screen scraping plus.”300 Banks must now
ensure that their interfaces comply with these communication standards.301
Despite the dedicated APIs, there are still concerns that such an interface
could be unavailable or not performing to the required standard.302 This
gives rise to the “fall-back” option — banks must permit this type of thirdparty access until the dedicated interface is restored to the required level of
availability and performance.303
Controversy about the presence of this fall-back option — with the EBA

295. See generally Han-Wei Liu, Two Decades of Laws and Practice Around Screen
Scraping in the Common Law World and Its Open Banking Watershed Moment, 30
WASH. INT’L L. J. 28 (2020) (comparing regulatory frameworks among different
countries and arguing that data sharing initiatives could reduce demand for screen
scraping).
296. THE TREASURY (AUSTL.), REVIEW INTO OPEN BANKING, supra note 15, at 125–
26.
297. See RTS, supra note 98, § 2 at 37–42 (“Specific requirements for the common
and secure open standards of communication.”).
298. Id. art. 38(2) at 42; Zunzunegui, supra note 59, at 29.
299. RTS, supra note 98, art. 31 at 38. Note that a TPP has an obligation to identify
itself under PSD II articles 66(3)(d) and 67(2)(c).
300. Adam Polanowski & Przemyslaw Gruchala, Can a User’s Account be Accessed
Through Screen Scraping?, NEWTECH LAW (Mar. 15, 2019), https://newtech.law/en/cana-users-account-be-accessed-through-screen-scraping/.
301. Zunzunegui, supra note 59, at 29.
302. RTS, supra note 98, art. 33 at 39–40.
303. Id. art. 33(4) at 39.
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opposing it and the European Commission in favor of it304 — led to it being
tempered with an exemption under Article 33(6) of the RTS.305 Under this
provision, banks can be exempted from the requirement that they implement
the fall-back mechanism if they can demonstrate that they meet four
conditions: they have complied with Article 32’s requirements for dedicated
interfaces, have stress-tested the dedicated interface for at least six months,
proven wide usage by TPPs for at least three months, and have resolved any
problems with the dedicated interface without undue delay.306 If all of these
requirements are met, the competent national authority (in the UK, the FCA)
may provide an exemption, such that the bank is not required to allow screen
scraping as a fall-back option.307 In accessing the data held by such banks,
PSPs are thus not permitted to use screen scraping under any
circumstances.308
In short, TPPs may legitimately employ screen scraping plus (which
identifies the TPP and thus complies with PSD II requirements) where a bank
modifies their existing interface for this purpose rather than creating an
API.309 Where the bank instead creates an API for data access, screen
scraping can only be conducted in narrow circumstances — specifically,
where the API is not performing to the required standard.310 The legality of
screen scraping is even further restricted where a bank has implemented a
compliant, stress-tested, and widely-used API. In such cases, the FCA can
provide an exemption to the fall-back provision, ensuring that accessing
bank-held data via screen scraping will always be prohibited.311
ii. Australian Model
The role of screen scraping is less evident in Australia, with CDR
legislation being silent on the issue. Rather than prohibiting or endorsing
304. Screen scraping was prohibited entirely in the EBA’s original draft. Rationales
included that TPPs using screen scraping were in violation of the obligation to identify
themselves under PSD II articles 65(3)(d), 67(2)(c), and that they gained access to
information unnecessary for the provision of service. However, certain stakeholders
lobbied against this total ban, leading the European Commission to introduce the fallback
provision in a later draft of the RTS. See Wolters & Jacobs, supra note 188, at 36.
305. Id.; EUR. BANKING AUTH., GUIDELINES ON THE CONDITIONS TO BENEFIT FROM
AN EXEMPTION FROM THE CONTINGENCY MECHANISM UNDER ARTICLE 33(6) OF
REGULATION (EU) 2018/389 (RTS ON SCA & CSC) 3 (2018).
306. RTS, supra note 98, art. 33(6) at 40.
307. Id.
308. Wolters & Jacobs, supra note 188, at 36.
309. See RTS, supra note 98, arts. 30–31 at 37–38. The obligation for a TPP to
identify itself is imposed under PSD II articles 66(3)(d) and 67(2)(c).
310. See RTS, supra note 98, art. 33 at 39–40.
311. Id. art. 33(6) at 40; Wolters & Jacobs, supra note 188, at 36.
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this practice, the Farrell Review recommended Open Banking should aim to
make the practice redundant by facilitating more efficient data transfer
mechanisms.312 More recently, the Australian Securities and Investments
Commission (“ASIC”) expressed that it has no intention to prevent screen
scraping, though it has foreshadowed in its recently released Consultation
Paper 341 that customers will be liable for loss arising from authorized
transactions following the use of screen scraping under certain
circumstances.313 However, despite its apparent legality in this sense, there
is some uncertainty about the resulting liability where screen scraping has
been used. For instance, as mentioned above, the ASIC has noticed that by
providing their login details, a consumer could be in breach of the standard
banking terms and conditions for non-disclosure of passwords, thus
potentially losing their protection under the ePayments Code and becoming
liable for losses that occur.314 This issue was also identified in the Farrell
312. THE TREASURY (AUSTL.), REVIEW INTO OPEN BANKING, supra note 15, at x
(noting that “customer data should be transferred via APIs” in accordance with
appropriate rules and standards).
313. Joseph Brookes, Fintechs Get ‘Screen Scraping’ Green Light From Australian
Regulators, WHICH-50 (Mar. 3, 2020), https://which-50.com/fintechs-get-screen-scrap
ing-green-light-from-australian-regulators/ (quoting the Executive Director of the
Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Tim Gough: “[the agency] would
monitor the market closely but had no plans to prevent screen scraping”); AUSTL. SEC.
& INV. COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER 341: REVIEW OF THE EPAYMENTS CODE:
FURTHER CONSULTATION 36 (2021) [hereinafter ASIC CONSULTATION PAPER 341],
https://asic.gov.au/media/eh2fceff/cp341-published-21-may-2021.pdf (“It is not a
prohibition on the use of screen scraping but clarifies the position that a consumer takes
particular actions at their own risks.”).
314. THE TREASURY (AUSTL.), REVIEW INTO OPEN BANKING, supra note 15, at 51.
ePayments Code section 11.2 states that where a bank can “prove on the balance of
probabilities that a user contributed to the loss through . . . breaching the pass code
security requirements in clause 12,” the customer is liable in full. Clause 12 requires that
a customer does not “voluntarily disclose pass codes to anyone,” which is breached when
providing a TPP with security credentials so that they may use screen scraping
technology. More recently, Australian Senate’s Select Committee on Financial
Technology and Regulatory Technology, in its interim report, suggested that “an outright
ban on screen scraping is not prudent at the present time, . . . in many cases these
practices are enabling companies to innovate and provide competition in the financial
services sector. This situation should continue to be monitored, however, as Open
Banking is rolled out.” SENATE SELECT COMM. ON FIN. TECH. & REGUL. TECH., INTERIM
REPORT (2020) [hereinafter SENATE SELECT COMM., INTERIM REPORT],
https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/committees/reportsen/024366/toc_pdf/Se
lectCommitteeonFinancialTechnologyandRegulatoryTechnology.pdf;fileType=applicat
ion%2Fpdf. As noted above, while ASIC has no plan to ban screen scraping, it has
indicated that customers will have to bear the risks in using screen scraping if (i) the use
of that service “amounted to ‘disclosure’ of the consumer’s passcode; and (ii) the
subscriber (i.e., banks that subscribe to the e-Payment Code) can “prove on the balance
of probability that the use of that services contributed to the loss.” ASIC CONSULTATION
PAPER 341, supra note 313, at 36.
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Review.315
It seems a shame that the Australian government did not phase out screen
scraping or at least keep it as an exception. For one, allowing screen scraping
could essentially create two-tiered system where scrapers would continue to
utilize this technique, which runs counter to other government security
advice,316 undermines the purpose of the consumer data right,317 and could
result in the loss of protections under the ePayments Code.318 For another, it
would provide little, if any, incentive for some fintech players to seek
accreditation if they could instead rely on screen scraping, resulting in
financially vulnerable people continuing to engage with non-CDR accredited
entities bound by lower privacy protections.319 However, one should also
bear in mind the potential anti-competitive effects associated with a total ban
— which seems more feasible until the CDR regime becomes mature.320
This is especially so considering that the Australian economy heavily relies
on screen scraping as a cost-effective tool.321
315. THE TREASURY (AUSTL.), REVIEW INTO OPEN BANKING, supra note 15, at 52
(stating that customers may not be “aware precisely what they’ve done in providing their
login details in this way”).
316. FIN. RIGHTS LEGAL CTR. & CONSUMER ACTION L. CTR., SUBMISSION NO. 36,
COMMENT ON THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY AND
REGULATORY TECHNOLOGY’S INQUIRY INTO FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY AND REGULATORY
TECHNOLOGY 12 (2019) (arguing that the practice is “exactly opposite to every other
piece of online safety and security advice”).
317. Id. at 16 (noting that the Consumer Data Right creates “a fundamental right to
port and transfer one’s own personal financial data . . . but in a safe environment” and
“[w]ithout a ban on screen-scraping . . . there is very little incentive for businesses . . . to
use CDR accredited software over screen scaping technology”).
318. Id. at 14 (indicating that “providing access to one’s banking data using screen
scraping technology amounts to a breach of the terms and conditions of a customer’s
bank account, and places customers at risk of losing their protections under the EPayments Code” under section 11.2).
319. Id. at 16–17 (providing a quote from FinTech Australia, which notes that “many
fintech companies are happy with existing screen scraping solutions, and are likely to
continue to use these solutions”).
320. FINTECH AUSTL., SUBMISSION NO. 19, SUBMISSION PAPER: SENATE ISSUES PAPER
RESPONSE 35 (2019) (arguing that banning screen scraping would be anticompetitive as
screen scraping is the most “secure, economical, accessible, and accepted system by
which fintechs can and do seek information”).
321. FINTECH AUSTL., SUBMISSION PAPER: SUBMISSION TO OPEN BANKING INQUIRY 9
(2017) (noting that the most successful companies are those that can access and utilize
consumer data, increasingly so in the financial services industry, and outlawing screen
scaping will harm Australian companies’ ability to do so and compete with other
companies internationally). According to FinTech Australia, to be CDR accredited
receipts, it would cost between $100,000 AUD to $250,000 AUD. Thus, it suggested
that “CDS must be implemented in a way that is ‘easier to access, provides better
functionality and is cheaper than screen scraping.” On the cost-benefit analysis, see, e.g.,
FINTECH AUSTL., SUBMISSION PAPER: SUBMISSION TO THE AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION
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Overall, while it seems that screen scraping is currently legal as a
technique running parallel to the CDR scheme, this is controversial and may
be subject to change, with various stakeholders arguing for or against a ban.
There is also uncertainty as to liability associated with the practice.322
IV. CONCLUSION
While many countries have reacted to the changing landscape by rolling
out Open Banking initiatives to tap into the potential of consumer banking
data, their responses have taken different shapes. As discussed, although
both the UK and Australia have adopted mandatory approaches that require
data sharing with certain common features, there are striking differences.
While Australia casts a wide net with a cross-sector CDR regime, the UK
model applies to only the banking sector — though the recent “Smart Data”
initiative reveals that the UK seems to be moving towards the Australian
approach by applying data sharing to other sectors. Both regimes apply to a
wide range of data to be shared, though Australia has reacted to the industry
by excluding materially enhanced information from the scope of data
sharing.
The UK maintains a clear framework for allocating liabilities between
different parties; it is regrettable, however, that Australia’s CDR has no such
comparable system yet. Both jurisdictions have dedicated frameworks
dealing with security and data protection issues; yet, the relationship between
the PSs and Privacy Act/APPs in Australia is rather complicated for
compliance. Screen scraping is generally banned in the UK except for the
fall-back option. However, it is not yet prohibited in Australia, given that
many online businesses still heavily rely on this handy tool for their
operations. While it may be too early to judge which model will prevail, it
is clear that the Australian model missed the opportunity to tackle some of
the more critical issues head-on. These nuanced differences may
nevertheless help other jurisdictions reflect on their regulatory approaches in
this data-driven shifting landscape.

AND CONSUMER COMMISSION
]PARTY SERVICE PROVIDERS

CONSUMER DATA RIGHT- PARTICIPATION OF THIRD[(2020), https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/CDR%
20Rules%20-%20Intermediaries%20consultation%20submission%20-%20Fintech%20
Australia%20REDACT.pdf; SENATE SELECT COMM., INTERIM REPORT, supra note 314,
at 152.
322. However, ASIC’s acting Executive Director recently told the Senate Committee
that there is “no evidence of which we’re aware of any consumer loss from screen
scraping.” See Brookes, supra note 313.

